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Abstract
Over the last decade, many companies in industries that produce complex and
technologically-advanced products have begun to integrate their operations along the
value chains of the primary products they design, produce or sustain. Increasingly,
integration efforts have moved beyond the boundaries of the core or focal enterprise
serving as the prime contractor or system integrator to span the entire value chain, to
form virtual extended enterprises. These structures allow the members of the virtual
extended enterprise to focus on their core competencies in order to collaboratively deliver
a world-class product at a competitive price.
While integration offers many benefits to enterprises, a high degree of integration is not
always desirable or advantageous in a limited duration virtual extended enterprise
composed of autonomous companies. Virtual extended enterprises must find a balance
between decoupled collaboration and highly coupled integration, balancing the need to
closely coordinate their efforts with the need protect the autonomy of their members.
The objective of this research is to explore the extent to which a focal enterprise, such as
a prime contractor or system integrator, should consider integration across its virtual
extended enterprise, identify major barriers to integration, and define key enablers of
integration overcoming these barriers. Analysis focuses on the extent of integration based
on the characteristics of the virtual extended enterprise, such as the duration and scope of
the program in question, product system architecture, the organizational architecture, and
the external environment. In particular, three key conceptual dimensions of integration
are developed and explored-technological integration, strategic integration, and
organizational integration. This framework is applied in an in-depth case study of
integration strategies on the virtual extended enterprise of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) Program. The knowledge gained from the case study is used to make
recommendations for the development of integration strategies for future programs.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Kirkor Bozdogan
Title: Principal Research Associate, Center for Technology, Policy, and
Industrial Development
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Executive Summary
Over the last decade, many companies in industries that produce complex and
technologically-advanced products have begun to integrate their operations along the
value chains of the primary products they design, produce or sustain. Increasingly,
integration efforts have moved beyond the boundaries of the core or focal enterprise
serving as the prime contractor or system integrator to span the entire value chain, to
form virtual extended enterprises. These are value chains in which key players have
created a set of technical collaboration processes that allow them to work together as an
integrated team over the limited life of a program. These vertically coordinated networks
of enterprises are becoming increasingly common on time-limited programs and projects,
particularly in high-complexity industries such as aerospace and automotive. These
structures allow the members of the virtual extended enterprise to focus on their core
competencies in order to collaboratively deliver a world-class product at a competitive
price.
With the proliferation of information and communication technology in recent years,
there has been a movement in many industries towards integration of the individual
enterprise. Integration entails uniting communication infrastructures, strategies,
organizations, and processes across the enterprise so that they behave in a coherent,
directed fashion. While integration offers many benefits to the single enterprise, a high
degree of integration is not always desirable or advantageous in a limited duration virtual
extended enterprise composed of autonomous companies. Virtual extended enterprises
must find a balance between decoupled collaboration and highly coupled integration.
They must balance the need to closely coordinate their efforts with the need to not
infringe upon the autonomy of their members.
The objective of this research is to explore the extent to which a focal enterprise, such as
a prime contractor or system integrator, should consider integration across its virtual
extended enterprise, identify major barriers to integration, and define key enablers of
integration overcoming these barriers. Analysis focuses on the extent of integration based
on the characteristics of the virtual extended enterprise, such as the duration and scope of
the program in question, product system architecture, the organizational architecture, and
the external environment. In particular, three key conceptual dimensions of integration
are developed and explored-technological integration, strategic integration, and
organizational integration. This framework is applied in an in-depth case study of
integration strategies on the virtual extended enterprise of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) Program. The knowledge gained from the case study is used to make
recommendations for the development of integration strategies for future programs. The
case study is based on extensive field interviews with technical and management
personnel associated with the JSF Program, using a semi-structured in-person interview
process employing a questionnaire survey instrument.
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This research proposes that any attempt at integration needs to be solidly based upon each
of these three dimensions. Two key areas-lack of central authority and level of
allegiance-are identified that make integration in virtual extended enterprises unique
from other forms of enterprise integration explored in the literature, and make policy and
architecture much more important components of integration strategies.
The case study of the JSF Program focuses on the specific drivers that have shaped the
integration strategies of the JSF Program such as architecture, political concerns, US
export control laws, and funding structures. These drivers of integration are explored
using the three-dimensional framework developed earlier in the thesis.
The JSF Program has been heralded as a flagship of defense acquisition reform, and
program integration plays a major role in this reform process. When exploring possible
integration strategies, the JSF Program strived to go beyond simply minimizing
transaction costs and decided to view integration as a strategic capability. This entailed a
fundamental redesign of the enterprise network, allowing it to perform much more
efficiently and effectively over the longer run than a traditional prime-contractor-
subcontractor relationship. The systems, policies and structures in place for integration do
more than simply reduce or minimize transaction costs to ensure that networked
structures are economically feasible. They enable the extended enterprise to behave in
revolutionary new ways that allow it to operate as a single entity, and to focus on its
performance over multiple time scales-short-, medium-, and long-term. This reflects a
new mental model of enterprise architecture and helps to develop a coherent set of
strategies, technical plans, and organizational designs that work together in concert.
Through wise application of technology, the JSF Program has made great strides towards
overcoming many barriers to integration, such as close collaboration with the
international partners within the constraints of US export control law and the
establishment of a network-wide knowledge repository. The primary enabler of these
integration activities was a large, centralized IT system that integrated tools, processes,
and documentation into a collaborative environment that allows for version and access
control. This system has been viewed by many both in the program as well as externally
as the critical component of the JSF Program's integration strategy. While the computer
systems developed for the program are essential enablers, they work in concert with a
sound strategic plans and organizational designs to facilitate an integrated, effective
program.
Integration for its own sake, however, will not necessarily yield benefits. In some
instances, there may have been over-integration in certain areas and not a sufficient
degree of integration in others, perhaps reflecting a possible mismatch between the
product system architecture and the resulting extended enterprise organizational
architecture. For instance, several of those interviewed stated that greater efforts could be
made to match the level of integration in the organizational architecture to the level of
integration in the product system architecture, especially on more complex systems such
as avionics. The varying levels of technical integration across the aircraft product system
architecture might suggest similarly varying levels of integration in enterprise
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organizational architecture in order to achieve the full benefits of enterprise integration at
the lowest possible cost. A uniform, undifferentiated, enterprise integration strategy with
one-size-fits-all integration policies and practices across the whole program may prove
more costly than necessary to derive the expected benefits of integration
An important barrier to optimal enterprise integration that has been suggested in the
literature in such large-scale, complex, extended virtual enterprises is the tendency of the
individual enterprises, and especially the prime contractor, to retain in-house work that
could be outsourced to another organization and performed better in terms of cost, quality
and delivery. The literature suggests such a barrier can be overcome using an unbiased
"competency manager" or team to assign work based on capability alone. The field
interviews suggest that this may be an issue in some areas of the JSF Program, such as
the development of the Virtual Processing Center, but to what extent this is an issue that
seriously affects network-wide performance is difficult to ascertain. This is an example of
a barrier that should perhaps be more generally addressed by the project sponsor, rather
than internally by the individual participating organizations, while keeping in mind that
although such an approach is appealing in theory it is most likely to prove rather difficult
in practice.
Additionally, while the strategic and technical dimensions of integration are fairly strong
on the JSF Program, many of those interviewed indicated that the organizational
dimension is comparatively weaker. Several instances were identified by those
interviewed in which organizational and socio-technical barriers to integration made
technical and strategic integration efforts more difficult. This was particularly the case in
the implementation of the Virtual Processing Center, which encountered some delays due
to socio-technical concerns such as the lack of stakeholder buy-in, disconnects in
expected functionality, and inadequate training with the new system. Many of these
barriers were directly attributable to the culture of the development environment on the
program and potentially could have been mitigated.
In the case of the JSF Program, many barriers to integration, and especially international
integration, have been imposed by the US Department of Defense on the program in the
name of protecting national security. Some of these policies are shown to significantly
hinder the development process on the JSF Program while not positively contributing
towards greater national security. One policy recommendation made was to extent the
so-called "Canadian Exemption" to the UK, the staunch ally of the US. Another policy
recommended to the DoD is to consider using unbiased competency brokers in the
network to source contracts, especially after contract awards have come under
international scrutiny.
The JSF Program provides an excellent opportunity to examine integration strategies on a
large, fully-functional virtual extended enterprise within the US military aerospace
context. The lessons learned from this case study are hoped to be helpful to other
acquisition programs that are likely to follow in the footsteps of the JSF program.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Motivation
In a global marketplace, businesses are relentlessly driven by the competitive
pressures of industry to achieve "world class" status. In industries that deal with large,
highly complex products and services such as the automotive, aerospace, and large-scale
construction industries, it is increasingly impossible for a single firm to become "world
class" in all facets of the industry. Instead, the apparent trend has been to concentrate on
core competencies while forming temporary partnerships and alliances with other
businesses that posses complimentary competencies in order to take advantage of fleeting
business opportunities.
The idea of complementary business alliances is not new-it has been common in
many industries, such as large-scale construction and the automotive industry, for several
decades(Malone, 1991). What is new and makes these arrangements so interesting is that
modem information technologies have given these temporary business alliances the
potential to integrate themselves to an unprecedented degree, merging processes and
computer systems almost seamlessly. This paves the way for a wide range of
collaborative structures, ranging from a seamless "virtual enterprise" whose products and
processes move transparently and seamlessly between the many firms constituting the
alliance, to loosely affiliated businesses alliances that use computer networks to
coordinate and collaborate using more traditional business-to-business transactions.
Externally, the collaborative, networked organization as a whole may appear to
customers as a single entity, but later will disintegrate and reform into a new partnership
for a new business opportunity. The key to these collaborative structures is integration
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across the collaborative alliance. Information technologies serve as a catalyst for new
forms of integration, facilitating collaboration and new patterns of behavior in these
"enterprise networks"(Venkatraman, 1994).
These structures and the degree of integration they require are fairly new in the
market, and are not yet well proven. It has been implicitly assumed that integration and
collaborative, networked organizations are necessarily good in much of the literature and
by those in the information technology industry without a careful examination of the
circumstances where integration is most useful, and where its faces diminishing returns.
Over the past decade, several enterprises attempting to integrate their internal processes
and computing systems have faced spectacular failures, and some systems when
"successfully" implemented did not yield the benefits that they promised to the
enterprise. It is not clear that integration is always the correct path to pursue. Beyond the
issue of how integration is achieved, the question "should integration be attempted"
should first be asked.
Technologically enabled, collaborative alliances have raised many questions on
the part of those who architect and manage them even after it is determined that
integration is an appropriate strategy within the market. The creation of enterprise
networks is still a nascent endeavor, and dominant architectures and strategies have yet to
emerge, despite large-scale coordinated attempts to set standards for cross-industry
collaboration and communication(NIIP, 1996). Integration of the enterprise network is a
critical issue for the architects of such networks, as it drives strategy, organization, and
technology across the entire network. Most architects realize the imperative for
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integration, but the questions remain: how does one integrate, and to what extent should
one integrate an enterprise network?
To date, there has not been a successful effort to establish a widely-applicable,
theory-based approach to the development of strategies for the integration of enterprise
networks. Such integration strategies have largely been "one-off' efforts, highly
customized, manual, ad-hoc processes, in contrast to more developed methodologies that
rely on established theory(Ouzounis, 2001). Finnrms are rightfully hesitant to share their
valuable data and processes that integration might require with other industry members
and potential competitors. Further, they are unsure what degree of integration is
necessary to both create a viable enterprise network that delivers value to its customer
while retaining the core competencies and intellectual property that allow it to add value
as an independent entity. It may be that the process of integrating may create more
problems than it solves.
Firms participating in enterprise networks often find that there are many unseen
barriers to their integration strategies. It is not possible to simply meet cooperative
standards or to purchase a particular IT system and then be able to participate
successfully in an enterprise network-integration of enterprise networks is a multi-
faceted endeavor that must embrace all of the facets-strategic, technical, and
organizational-in order to be successful.
1.1 Research Objective and Questions
The objective of this thesis is to identify barriers and enablers to enterprise-wide
integration in large, extended, virtual enterprises such as those found in the aerospace
industry. The thesis will also examine the extent to which firms adopt integration
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strategies within these enterprise networks, dependant upon both the architecture of the
network and the architecture of the product it produces, focusing on the transfer of
knowledge and processes between firms. The thesis will explore integration strategies in
greater detail using an in-depth case study of the extended enterprise of the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter Program, focusing on the specific concerns of a virtual, extended enterprise
and within the aerospace industry subject to the restrictions of US Export Control Laws.
This research aims to identify and examine the fundamental issues of enterprise
integration across the enterprise value stream from multiple perspectives and search for
underlying principles that can help identify whether, to what extent, how and when
enterprise networks should integrate, as well as how to mitigate key barriers.
The hypothesis is that the integration strategies of most nascent enterprise
networks are overly focused on specific tools, protocols and off-the-shelf software
products with a high emphasis on the enabling technology of integration. They view
integration primarily as a concern for the Information Technology division, rather than as
a driver of the entire organization. The integration efforts of enterprise networks are far
more successful when they take a broader, more holistic approach that aligns the
integration strategy and architecture of the network with three key facets of integration:
strategy, technology, and organization. This research will examine enterprise integration
strategies through these key three areas, relating key concerns in each area with one
another, and detailing how effective integration strategies balance the needs and
requirements of all three areas.
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The key questions that this research hopes to address include the following:
* What are the fundamental integration issues within a complex enterprise network?
* To what extent is knowledge integration necessary and desirable across the
network?
* What are the key internal and external barriers to integration in an enterprise
network?
* Are there overarching principles that can guide whether, to what extent, when,
and how complex enterprise networks might integrate?
1.2 Relevance and Significance
The trend towards the formation of enterprise networks in many industries with
complex products is clear(Camarinha-Matos, 1999c; Cummins, 2002). The aerospace
industry in particular is good example of one such industry that is greatly affected by this
trend. By focusing solely on their core competencies, firms participating in enterprise
networks in these industries in theory have a better chance of maintaining their world-
class status and advantage within the industry. To achieve this goal, they face the
daunting task of integrating large, complex enterprises with disparate policies,
organizations, cultures, and technologies.
Although many efforts at integration in the past have failed, modern enterprises
continue to direct their energy towards these efforts. As this trend becomes more
prevalent and enterprise networks grow larger and more complex, the need for research
directed at the barriers and enablers to integrating such design and manufacturing-
oriented business structures will grow greatly in importance in many industries such as
aerospace. To date, most enterprise integration strategies have often been one
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dimensional, focusing almost exclusively on technology (and often failing or coming in
grossly over schedule and over-budget). Further, there has been little work done in
analyzing the relationship between the degree of integration in a network needed and the
architecture of the network's product. The guiding mantra to date has been "the more
integration the better," without careful analysis of the marginal benefits of integration.
Effective research in the domain of enterprise networks integration could potentially
make a large impact in the way enterprise networks of many sizes tie themselves together
technically, strategically, and organizationally.
This research lies at the heart of the strategies of billion-dollar firms as they seek out
more efficient business structures to create and deliver complex, high-value products to
their customers. This thesis relies on a multi-disciplinary body of research including work
in information technology, business strategy, and organizational theory to elicit principles
that will aid both large, established firms already engaged in enterprise networks as well
as small and medium sized firms hoping to establish themselves as valuable players in
large, complex, fast-moving markets.
1.3 Research Methodology
This thesis is composed of two parts: a literature review of general integration
strategies in enterprise networks, and a focused, in-depth case study of enterprise-wide
integration strategies of a large, virtual, extended enterprise network in the defense
aerospace industry. The case study was conducted on the integration strategies of the
Joint Strike Fighter Program, centered on the primary component of the network, the air
vehicle (the aspect of the aircraft under prime contract to Lockheed Martin Aeronautics).
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Non-attributable, semi-structured interviews were conducted at Lockheed Martin's Ft.
Worth facility over two separate three-day site visits six months apart in 2004. These
interviews were governed by the Lean Aerospace Consortium agreement with member
companies (Appendix A). Attempts were made to speak to those in leadership and other
high-level integration positions on the program, and all interviews were generously
coordinated through Lockheed Martin Aeronautics' Program Management Core.
Interviews were conducted with the heads of program management, material
management, system architecture, the Chief Engineer, manufacturing, as well as many
other people involved in integrative roles on the program.
All interviews were voluntary; not everyone contacted agreed to interviews. In
particular, only one company other than Lockheed Martin with employees in Ft. Worth
was willing to allow their employees to be interviewed during our site visit. Further
interviews via telephone and in Cambridge, MA during visits to the MIT campus.
19
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2 Chapter 2: Concepts in Enterprise Network
Integration
2.1 Definitions and Terms
Although there has been active research into enterprise integration and related
fields for almost a decade, the literature has not yet standardized on formal definitions for
many key terms. Accordingly, the literature in this multi-disciplinary field occasionally
seems confusing or at odds. The most basic concepts, such as enterprise, are very
commonly used without a universally agreed-upon definition by research communities
who undertake closely-related work. It is often assumed in the literature that the reader
will be able to infer what is meant by such terms as enterprise from its use in context as
well as from some common experience. While this may be appropriate if the intended
audience is a close-knit community with common experience with the term, it becomes a
point of confusion when read by someone in a related field who may have developed
these concepts independently, as has sometimes been the case (Caramarihna-Matos and
Afsarmanesh, 2004). For this reason, the basic terms and concepts used in this thesis will
be clearly defined below as they will be used throughout its remainder.
2.1.1 Enterprise
The term enterprise is highly contextual in nature. Much like the concept of
system, the scope of what an enterprise is largely depends on the perspective from which
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it is being viewed, allowing small businesses and international multi-program
undertakings alike to be hailed under the same banner.
In its most general form, Black's Law Dictionary defines an enterprise as "an
organization united by a common purpose," focusing on a common purpose as the
defining element of an enterprise. Murman et al. go on define this common purpose as
creating value, saying that an enterprise "is an integrated entity that efficiently creates
value for its multiple stakeholders...,"(Murman et. al, 2002). While these definitions
may be accurate descriptions of enterprises at their basic level, they lack a description of
the enterprise that motivates their study in the literature.
Bozdogan tackles this issue by defining enterprises as "purposeful, complex
adaptive technology-enabled socio-technical, open, dynamic and interdependent social-
economic-technological-organizational systems organized to create value for their
multiple stakeholders characterized by performing their core missions, functions or
businesses that serve societal purposes" multi-level interfaces and
interactions"(Bozdogan, 2004). This definition, while less transparent, captures the many
aspects and dimensions of enterprises that make them of such interest to scholars, while
maintaining the highly contextual nature of the enterprise.
In the realm of business enterprises, an enterprise is often analogous to a
traditional firm. As firms grow in size and scope, so can the boundaries of what can be
considered an enterprise. A single business unit of a larger firm can be considered an
enterprise, as it is united in a common purpose of creating value, while maintaining the
qualities of an enterprise described by Bozdogan. The enterprise concept can also be
extended upwards a level to include other business units of the same firm that also meets
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the definition of an enterprise. As long as it continues to meet the definition, the level can
be drawn higher to include allied firms and even industries, as the context dictates.
Whenever the concept of an enterprise is extended past the notion of a traditional
firm, however, it is usually used with a specific modifier such as "extended," "virtual," or
"core" to denote the way in which the term is intended. Even within the boundaries of a
traditional firm, some specific structures of enterprises have become common enough
that they have merited their own term, such as program enterprises and multi-program
enterprises. It is important while using the word enterprise that it is placed in a specific
context to avoid confusion in its application. The definitions below further distinguish
between the terms used to describe single enterprise and networked enterprise structures.
2.1.2 Enterprise Networks
The term "enterprise network" is a broad categorization that encompasses several
organizational forms that share common characteristics. Enterprise networks are
organizations that are composed of multiple autonomous firms working together towards
a common goal as a single coordinated and possibly integrated entity. This is a very
general classification-there is no notion of degree of connectivity (integration) or
requisite enabling infrastructures. The term enterprise network is analogous to the term
collaborative networked organizations used by Camarhina-Matos and Afsarmanesh to
represent these and other future collaborative-networked enterprise structures
(Camarhina-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2004).
Enterprise Networks are in many ways analogous to organization networks, as
defined in the organization science literature(Borgatti, 2003; Child, 2001; Schilling,
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2001). In this literature, networks are defined as a separate form distinct from both
hierarchies and markets as a form of business organization. Child and McGrath define
network organizations as "value creating systems of several organizations possessing
complementary strengths and coordinated through a combination of contractual
provisions and mutually beneficial relationships that are often orchestrated by a leading
member." Network organizations "involve an investment in relationships, a sense of
mutual benefit, a level of trust, and a level of coordination-all to a degree that is absent
in markets." Further, networks are not held together through employment relationships
or managed of the basis of bureaucratic rules and routines(Child, 2001).
The boundaries of an enterprise network are not well defined, but are dynamic
and contextual. Afuah suggests that the boundaries are dynamic, and that they may shift
over an efficient frontier that is shaped by both technology and industry(Afuah, 2001).
The boundaries of the enterprise network can be redefined in context. While an
enterprise network may consist of a prime contractor and its value chain, for example, it
likely does not extend down to suppliers of raw materials. At some point, a line must be
drawn between simple suppliers and suppliers that are integrated into the enterprise
network, often based on the density of information exchange, monetary and strategic
value of the exchange, etc. The boundaries can be different across otherwise comparable
enterprise networks.
Throughout this thesis, unless a more specific term is desired, the general term
enterprise network will be used in discussion, as it captures the broadest array of
collaborative, networked enterprise structures. More specific forms of enterprise
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networks are described below. Enterprise networks may fall under several of the
following classifications.
2.1.3 Core Enterprise
The concept of a "core enterprise," developed by Murman et al., refers to entities
that are "tightly integrated through direct or partnering relationships." The concept of the
"core enterprise" was developed primarily to compliment the idea of an extended
enterprise, discussed below. The core enterprise consists of the most tightly integrated
firms at the center of an extended enterprise. It could also describe a single focal firm at
the center of an extended enterprise.
The term retains little meaning outside the network context. An example of a
core enterprise would be the three principal partners on the Joint Strike Fighter's air
vehicle platform-Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems. This is
highlighted in the case study described in Chapters 5 through 9.
2.1.4 Extended Enterprise
Although several somewhat conflicting definitions of an extended enterprise
exist, they all agree that extended enterprises are an expansion of the scope of a core
enterprise to include a large portion of its value chain. Murman et al. describe extended
enterprises as "all of the entities along an organization's value chain, from its customer's
customers to its supplier's suppliers, that are involved with the design, development,
manufacture, certification, distribution and support of a product or family of products"
(Murman, et al, 2002). This expansion of scope is intended to cause firms to to think
about themselves in a more holistic sense, and to help them understand their role in the
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larger network in order to pull value from the entire value stream, including suppliers and
customers as part of a team that creates and delivers value.
Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh take a more limited view, and define
extended enterprises as networks that arise when "a single dominant firm 'extends' its
boundaries to all or some of its suppliers" (Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2004).
The boundary extension is not a physical one where the dominant firm acquires suppliers
and partners, but rather a partnering of the value stream that enables system-wide
optimizations and processes to be put into place, actively driven from the top down. The
power and clout of a single dominant firm or cohesive core of firms can be effective in
aligning interests through the extended enterprise.
Dyer defines the term to refer to "a value chain in which the key players have
created a set of collaboration processes that allow them to achieve virtual integration and
work together as an integrated team((Dyer, 2000)." Dyer sees the extended enterprise as
more than the simple collection of companies along the value chain, and considers the
processes they use as well as their integrated nature to be defining characteristics of
extended enterprises. The "key players" that Dyer refers to is the core enterprise. This
definition will be used as the reference for extended enterprises through this thesis.
The term extended enterprise as used by Dyer has a notion of high technological
connectedness. Extended enterprises are "virtually integrated," which usually is taken to
mean in the literature that the relationships are supported using information technology.
The term also has no notion of duration, so extended enterprises as a category can include
both temporary projects and programs as well as established value chains that are
competing in a market over the long-term.
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2.1.5 Virtual Enterprises
There have been many conflicting definitions of virtual enterprises over the years,
which is largely attributable to differences that exist across the information technology
(IT) and management communities. Those in management and organizational science
often conceive virtual enterprises without an inherent IT component, while those in the IT
community think that the notion of a virtual enterprise is inextricably linked to, if not
defined by, an IT infrastructure.
IT infrastructures aside, the literature from both fields involved in this research
agree to at least describe virtual enterprises as coordinated alliances formed to execute a
task or project with a temporal element. The National Industrial Infrastructure Protocol,
an early project in the US with the aim of creating mechanisms and protocols that would
eventually allow the formation of virtual enterprises, defines them as "a temporary
consortium or alliance of companies formed to share costs and skills and exploit fast-
changing market opportunities" (NIIIP, 1996). Here, there is no mention of a required
enabling IT infrastructure-they are simply companies linked via an alliance, aligned
along a common program, product, or service. Others, such as Byrne et al. emphasize the
importance of the infrastructure: "A virtual enterprise is a temporary network of
independent companies-suppliers, customers, even rivals-linked by information
technology to share skills, costs and access to one another's markets. It will have neither
central office nor organization chart. It will have no hierarchy, no vertical integration"
(Byrne et al, 1993). In contrast to most definitions, Byrne states that virtual enterprises
are largely ad hoc and void of organizational structure.
While it is arguable that such a "virtual" enterprise could exist through alliance
and consortium alone(Drucker, 1988), today's market realities and the need for fast and
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accurate communication require some sort of enabling IT infrastructure. However, this
infrastructure enables the virtual enterprise, rather than defines it. For this reason,
Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, when forming the definition used by the European
ESPRIT IV PRODNET project, sought to merge these definitions into one that takes all
of these aspects into account: "A virtual enterprise is a temporary alliance of enterprises
that comes together to share skills or core competencies and resources in order to better
respond to business opportunities, and whose cooperation is supported by computer
networks" (Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 1999). This definition captures the most
salient points from the previous definitions, while acknowledging the role of IT in virtual
enterprises. The most crucial aspects emphasized are networking and collaboration. The
aim of a virtual enterprise is to create a network of independent enterprises with aligned
goals to collaborate as if they were a single entity. The basic idea of virtual enterprises is
not new to the business world, but the use of new technologies and tools to enable
collaboration makes the concept much more effective, and has the potential to transform
many highly complex, interconnected industries.
The term virtual enterprise is sometimes used interchangeably in the literature
with the term virtual organization. There is a difference between the two, however, and
interchanging the terms should be avoided. Most definitions of virtual organizations
make no mention of a temporal aspect of the endeavor. Ahuja and Carley state that
virtual organizations are simply any organization that uses "electronic mail to share
information and coordinate their work ... allowing them create and sustain an identify
without sharing a physical work environment." They are not temporary alliances of
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organizations, with a specific business objective, but rather a traditional organization that
depends on IT for communication purposes(Ahuja, 1999).
2.1.6 Program Enterprises
A program enterprise (or project-based enterprise) is an enterprise that is
centered on a program, "a particular product, system or service that is delivered to the
customer and generates revenue." (Murman, et al, 2002). Programs generally have
accountability for cost, schedule and performance of a product, system or service.
Programs can also vary widely in size and in time. The largest program enterprises, such
as those found in defense and civil engineering, are highly complex, multi-billion dollar
endeavors, while at the low end, some programs may not be large enough to be
considered independant enterprises. The duration of program enterprises is dependant on
the life of the program, which could range from short-lived to practically indefinite.
2.2 Enterprise Networks under Consideration: Virtual Extended
Enterprises
This research will focus on enterprise networks that can be simultaneously
considered extended enterprises, virtual enterprises, and program enterprises. These
virtual extended enterprises are extended enterprises formed around a single time-limited
program where collaboration and integration is enabled by IT. This form of enterprise
network is emerging as a common form of enterprise network in the aerospace industry,
and many established industries are moving towards collaborative networks. The
characteristics of virtual extended enterprises, as well as a framework for analyzing
enterprise networks as a whole, is presented in Section 2.3.
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2.2.1 Integration
The term "integration" is a word that is also frequently used without a precise
definition. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, integration is "the making up or
composition of a whole by adding together or combining the separate parts or elements;
combination into an integral whole." When used within the domain of business and
information technology, however, the term has often been applied strictly to the bringing
together of computer networks and applications to allow them to communicate between each
other.
As used in this thesis, the term integration refers to the bringing together of two
entities in such a way that unites and coordinates not only their computing resources, but
also their strategies, processes, and organization so that the integrated enterprise behaves
that behaves as a coherent entity. The constituent enterprises of an integrated enterprise
network retain their autonomy, but function in a coordinated fashion using common
infrastructure and processes across boundaries.
2.2.2 The Continuum of Integration
Integration can be seen as an extreme on a scale that ranges from free market
coordination at one end of the continuum to full integration as described above at the other.
Free market coordination is the loose, often implicit coordination that exists between
enterprises in a free market. Market coordination can be based on price, published strategy,
and other indirect forms of communication that are facilitated by the market. There is no
explicit relationship between firms, and little trust is built. Moving a step closer to
integration on the continuum, the next level is cooperation. When two enterprises cooperate,
they directly communicate and identify divisions of labor and desired directions and
outcomes. They exchange non-sensitive information, and may establish an on-going
relationship, building a base level of trust.
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Beyond cooperation is collaboration, where enterprises begin to exchange sensitive
information such as performance metrics, long-term strategy, and process data. The density
of communication in collaborative enterprises is higher than in cooperative enterprises, and a
larger degree of trust is built. Strategies are more aligned in collaborating enterprises, as
fates could be closely aligned. While communication is high, divisions remain between
collaborating enterprises and the processes and infrastructure between them remain separate
and distinct. As collaboration is taken further, and these boundaries are gradually erased,
integration occurs, with the highest level of inter-firm trust.
2.3 Characteristics and Classification of Enterprise Networks
As seen in theory and practice, enterprise networks, and the smaller subset of
virtual extended enterprises, can vary in several dimensions that can affect the approach
to integration taken by the network. The purpose of characterization and classification of
general enterprise networks in this thesis is to briefly expose the reader to the wide
variety of enterprise networks possible, and to describe in detail the characteristics of the
enterprise networks that this thesis will consider in order to understand how integration
strategies align with enterprise architectures.
2.3.1 Characterization of Enterprise Networks
From the definition of enterprise networks developed in Section 2.1, it is clear
that some of the key characteristics of an enterprise network include degree of
integration, extent of computer networking, agency of participating enterprises, and
limited duration. The degree of integration, and the extent of computer networking can
vary widely according to the needs of the network, but are present to some degree in all
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enterprise networks. While multi-party alliances are very common business
arrangements (the top 500 global business have an average of 60 major collaborative
alliances each (Dyer, 2001)), most are simply cooperating rather than collaborating or
integrating themselves to the point that they could be considered an enterprise
network(Camarinha-Matos, 2004).
Although highly integrated enterprise networks may perform as though they were
a single organization under central control, they are not. Enterprise networks are
networks of independent enterprises, cooperating because they each can achieve more
through cooperation than they can by acting in the market as unaffiliated agents. If this
condition no longer holds, the enterprise is free to leave the network. Enterprise networks
last only as long as they continue to provide value for their members, and then they
disorganize. A key characteristic underlying the operation of enterprise networks is their
sharp focus on value-added relationships (Hawkins, 2004).
Enterprise networks are not analogous to holding companies and their constituent
holdings loosely directed from a corporate headquarters. An enterprise network is not a
legal entity with shareholders or an elected board of directors, and as such, it has been
argued that it therefore has no obligations as a collective. The enterprise network does
not own property, execute contracts, pay taxes, hire employees, or receive benefits from
society as an entity-these are rights and benefits reserved for the individual enterprises
participating in the enterprise network. As such, it has been argued that many of the
basic tenets of Contract Theory would not apply to them, and alternative explanations are
sought to understand how ethics and morality in such an arrangement can be rationalized
(Hawkins, 2004).
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Enterprise networks cannot necessarily be easily characterized by their
organizational structure. The concept of an enterprise network is grounded on a diversity
of organizational models-namely, those of each enterprise member. There are many
organizational forms, and it has proven difficult in the literature to find network-wide
behavioral patterns at the regional or even sector levels. Instead, the behavior of
enterprise networks is often more tightly linked to the entrepreneurial capabilities of its
members(Camarinha-Matos, 2004).
Some have termed the organizational structure of the enterprise network, and
especially that of the program-based enterprise network, as an "adhocracy," borrowing
from Henry Mitzenburg's book The Structuring of Organizations, in reference to
enterprise networks' tendency thus far to be managed in an ad hoc, project-centric style,
in contrast to more traditional control regimes such as an "entrepreneurial style" or a
form of bureaucracy (Mitzenburg, 1979, Hawkins, 2004). According to Mitzenburg,
these adhocracies exist in rapidly changing environments, and can allow for greater
flexibility and higher levels of innovation.
2.3.2 Enterprise Network Life-cycle
A key characteristic of enterprise networks mentioned above is their temporal
nature. While a more general enterprise network may last indefinitely, virtual enterprises
and program-based enterprise networks and limited duration networks that are created
and destroyed by their constituent members as the network's environmental changes.
The common processes of creation, dissolution, operation and evolution make up the
basic life-cycle of all limited duration enterprise networks. See Figure 2.1. While others
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have dissected the life-cycle of these enterprise networks to a much finer level of
detail(Spinosa, 1998), for our general purposes these four stages are sufficient to
appreciate the importance of understanding enterprise network life-cycles(Camarinha-
Matos, 999c). It is essential that enterprises participating in a limited duration network
must share a common understanding of these life-cycle stages. There has been a research
emphasis focused on creating common tools and processes for managing each major, and
sometimes minor, stage in an enterprise network's life-cycle to reduce many of the
coordination barriers to the creation and management of enterprise networks(Spinosa,
1998).
The first major stage is creation, which is also the most critical stage to the
overall success of the network. The key activities in this initial stage include the
definition of many crucial aspects of business, technology, and organizational strategy,
and include partner selection, contract negotiation, definition of access rights, data and
information sharing, network joining and exiting procedures, and communication
definitions. Each of these processes is critical to the long-term vitality of the network and
are individually the subject of a great deal of current research in the field of enterprise
networks(Field, 2002; Lackenby, 2002; Mejia, 2002).
The second major stage is operation. This encompasses the routine day-to-day
operation of the network, where the many of the processes designed in the creation stage
are put into operation, and other more routine processes are implemented within the
information management architecture. Processes in this stage include secure data
exchange and information sharing, order management, dynamic planning and scheduling,
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and task management and coordination(Afsarmanesh, 1999; Gibon, 1999; Schreiber,
1999).
A third stage in the life-cycle of enterprise networks is evolution. This stage
handles the exceptions to routine operation, such as a change in the environment, a
change of network membership, or other events or conditions that would necessitate a
change in course and restructuring of the network. In this phase, many of the processes
from the creation phase are revisited.
The final life-cycle stage is dissolution, when an enterprise network has reached
the end of its useful life, either by completing its goals or through the determination of a
network partner, and must dissolve. Definition of liabilities for all parties, especially
manufacturers with products with their own life-cycle concerns must be assigned.
2.3.3 Roles in Enterprise Networks
In all but the very smallest of enterprise networks, there are specialized roles that
have emerged that allow the network to operate smoothly in the various phases of its life-
cycle. Some of these roles are filled by pre-existing organizations in the network that
have other obligations as well, while some may be filled by organizations devoted
exclusively to a necessary role. Some roles can be filled by organizations external to the
network. The most common roles in enterprise networks include the Coordinator,
Member, Broker, Project Manager, and Auditor(Camarinha-Matos, 1999a; Katzy, 1999).
Not all of these roles are necessary in every enterprise network, and many of the
responsibilities in smaller enterprise networks are distributed on an ad hoc basis, or
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handled by the Coordinator. For larger, more dynamic networks with multiple projects,
many of these roles become important and have dedicated resources allocated to them.
The Coordinator can be either a specialized, dedicated node in the network, or a
pre-existing member in the network can fill the position. In practice, this could be the
most powerful member (or members, in the case of a tightly knit core enterprise), or the
perhaps a member whose core competency is integration. In more hierarchical networks,
such as extended enterprises, this role naturally falls to the firm at the top of the value
chain (although not necessarily so). The Coordinator is tasked with many roles related to
network coordination, such as new member registration, infrastructure support and
evolution, and coordinates the network dissolution. The Coordinator would be tasked
with directing the network in pursuit of its common goals.
A Member of the network would, in addition to contributing its competencies
towards the completion of the network's product or service, be tasked with managing its
own information visibility, information and material exchange between partners, and
perhaps contact with customers directly for matters that directly relate to their products.
Members will maintain their autonomy to a great extent in the network, and retain
responsibility for their effective performance in the network.
One role that is sometimes not considered a dedicated enterprise network role but
is essential to the success of the network nonetheless is that of the Project Manager (PM).
The PM manages the engineering, order processing, and time and budget constraints of a
particular program, while managing enterprise network members who may have
problems. Some do no consider this a dedicated position devoted to the organization of
an enterprise network, but rather a position that is tied to a specific project(Camarinha-
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Matos, 1999c). This could be true of enterprise networks with many concurrent projects,
but in project-based enterprise networks that are the focus of this thesis, this distinction
can become non-existent and may become folded into the job of the Coordinator.
Other roles in an enterprise network include a dedicated Broker, sometimes
external to the network, whose sole duty is to seek out potential new members for the
network based on whatever criteria that the network determines. Another similar position
is the Competence Manager, who actively seeks out members with complementary
competencies and pairs them for suitable tasks. The Competence Manager should ideally
be an impartial party that objectively assigns tasks based on best value added, above
political and internal pressures. If the role of Competence Manager is not handled by a
disinterested party, the will be a risk that tasks within the network will be allocated in a
sub=optimal way that benefits some members at the expense of overall network
performance.
Network "coaches," dedicated to the design and evolution of the network's
computer infrastructure, are seen in larger networks as well as smaller structures.
Network auditors can also serve as third parties to perform independent third party
assessments of the financial resources of the network.
37
Table 2.1 - Possible Roles in an Enterprise Network
EN Coordinator * New Enterprise Registration
· Infrastructure support to new members
· Infrastructure development and evolution
* Network dissolution
Member * Contribute competencies to goals of network
* Manage its own information visibility
* Share and exchange data/materials throughout the
network
* Handle first contacts with customers
Project Manger * Manage schedule and budget of projects
* Direct engineering, order processing
* Manage members with problems
Broker * Recruit new Members into the Network
Competence Manager * Identify and match competencies within the network
Auditor * Performnn i dependent financial assessments for the
network
Network Coach * Direct construction and maintenance of network
infastructure
· Develop rules for order processing
Classification of Enterprise Networks
The variation among possible enterprise network structures lends itself to
classification in order to aid in identifying enabling infrastructures for these forms. The
earliest attempt to classify enterprise network structures was done by Camarinha-Matos
and Afsarmanesh (Afsarmanesh and Camarinha-Matos, 1997). The original taxonomy
suggests looking at five characteristics that can be used to categorize enterprises
networks. For purposes of this thesis, their taxonomy has been expanded and modified
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slightly to define seven key characteristics: duration, structure, participation,
governance, visibility, coupling, and size. The addition of size has been suggested by
(Laubacher, 2003), and coupling has been added as a measure of the degree of integration
between enterprises in the network.
Duration
The first characteristic considered in the Camarinha-Matos and Asfarmanesh
taxonomy is duration, which can vary considerably in enterprise networks. At one end of
the spectrum, an enterprise network can form spontaneously to take advantage of a
single, short-lived business opportunity. Such a network would need a tremendous
amount of pre-existing coordination mechanisms in place to quickly collaborate, and
subsequently dissolve. At the other end of the spectrum, enterprise networks may form to
fill a long-term business niche. Absent significant competition, such as in a public
municipality where several organizations work together to bring various utilities to
business and residential areas, there is little change in the network structure over time.
In between these two extremes lie many variations, although currently many
enterprise networks tend to have longer, although limited, durations. Even in shorter-
term industries, such as the auto industry, business alliances and partnerships tend to be
long term as the costs of developing a new partner are often very high. As these
switching costs are lowered with advances in IT and as many competencies become more
common, it is likely that the average duration of enterprise networks will shorten. In
creating scenarios for future organizational development, the MIT Scenarios Working
group considered longevity a key characteristic (after size) when considering possible
future trends in organization development(Laubacher, 2003).
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Structure
Enterprise network structure refers not to the static relationships between
elements in the network, but the dynamic nature of the network, ranging on a continuum
from highly dynamic to completely static. In dynamic, also called volatile, topologies,
entities have the ability to enter and exit the network at will, while static networks are
created in place with the intention that the network will remain unchanged over the
intended life of the enterprise network, as in many older traditional supply chains. More
dynamic enterprise networks will require additional infrastructure to facilitate entering,
and leaving the network, as well as partner selection.
Participation
The notion of participation in this taxonomy addresses the issue of exclusivity
within the network: are participating enterprises dedicated to a single network alliance,
or are they free to pursue membership in multiple networks, perhaps even with a
competitor in order hedge bets? In the non-exclusive case, there are much higher
requirements for data security, and more limited knowledge sharing among participants.
Non-exclusivity possibly decreases the overall level of trust in a given network, and will
likely lead to lower levels of integration and knowledge sharing across the network.
Governance
Governance is a dimension for enterprise network classification that refers to the
governance structure in the network. For example, enterprise networks can be centrally
coordinated or controlled, employing a star-like structure that is dominated by the core
enterprise that makes most strategic decisions for the network. The opposite of star-
shaped structures would be flat, decentralized structures that are more democratic in their
coordination and control. Between these two extremes, hybrids exist, such as a flat,
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democratic core with star-like supply chain that feeds this central partnership. See Figure
2.2.
Star Structure
Flat Democratic Neork
Hybrid Structure
Figure 2.2 - Governance Structures of Enterprise Networks
Regardless of governance structure, control mechanisms of some kind are needed
to make the network operable. In the case and star-shaped structure, governance is highly
centralized and directed from a single office, which is more straightforward and more in
line with traditional supplier networks of larger enterprises from the viewpoint of
infrastructure implementation. Although there is no large central authority in
decentralized, flat democratic networks, some central coordination is needed (agreement
on protocols, schedules, budget), and will be created to aid the network in decision-
making and resource allocation. It has been shown in decentralized enterprise networks
that a dedicated alliance function that provides an element of control and coordination
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greatly increases the likelihood of strategic success of the alliance(Dyer, 2001). As such,
it is likely that any enterprise network, regardless of structure, will require some level of
network governance.
Visibility
Another classification in this taxonomy is visibility. Visibility refers to the ability
that any given member of a network has to view product and process information from its
upstream and downstream neighbors. At one end of the spectrum, a members can only
gather information from its immediate neighbors that it has direct contracts with, as
would be the case in an older, traditional supply chain. At the other end of the visibility
spectrum, enterprises in the network could have multi-level visibility, which includes
access to some level of information across the entire network that could be used to fine-
tune the activities of individual members with the goal of globally optimizing the output
of the enterprise network as a whole. The detail and content of this multi-level visibility
might be an architectural element of the enterprise network.
Coupling
Coupling is a measure of how tight the integration is within an enterprise network,
ranging from tightly coupled, where all process information is shared and processes are
highly interconnected, to loosely coupled, where data is exchanged throughout the
network, but processes are not highly interconnected between individual enterprises,
allowing for a much higher degree of autonomy in the network.
A highly coupled enterprise network will have processes that couple firms not
only in a vertical, single-level supplier-contractor role, but also horizontally at the same
level between suppliers collaborating on a system, and at multi-levels, where a sub-tier
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supplier might work directly with a prime contractor in some situations. A characteristic
of a tightly coupled enterprise network will be a shorter average path length (where paths
between members are defined by a shared process) in a network theoretic sense between
any two randomly selected enterprises in the network than in networks with only single
level, vertical paths. The horizontal and multi-level connections in the network will be
concentrated within subsystems, however, and not randomly in a network, as has often
been studied in network theory. Figure 2.3 illustrates this principle.
Figure 2.3 - Coupling in Enterprise Networks. On the left, all processes flow vertically
between two levels and is considered weakly coupled. On the right, processes may flow
horizontally between actors on the same level, as well vertically across multiple levels is
considered tightly coupled.
Size
The last measure of enterprise networks is size, which is a fairly straight-forward
metric. Enterprise networks can range across a wide variety of sizes, from small and
medium sized, family owned businesses to billion-dollar international programs. The
size of an enterprise network can be measured either in terms of persons employed in the
enterprise network or in terms of budget.
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2.4 Classification and Characterization of Virtual, Extended
Enterprises
This thesis chooses to focus on the integration challenges of program-centric,
virtual extended enterprises. This class of enterprise networks shares all of the
characteristics of an extended enterprise with those of a virtual enterprise. Typically,
enterprise networks of this sort have evolved within large, program-centric industries
with complex products where large firms have taken an interest in engaging their entire
value stream in a collaborative way. There is a high reliance on information technology,
and the processes and information that flow between members of the network tend to be
more tightly coupled.
The core enterprise takes on many of the leadership roles within virtual extended
enterprises. This firm (or firms) usually serves in the role of network coordinator, broker,
and program manager. This firm possesses the majority of power in the network and
often has budgetary authority over the entire program. Moving from a traditional supply
chain structure to an virtual extended enterprises in these cases involves significantly
empowering the supply chain and more closely involving the customer in matters of
requirements, design, manufacture, and logistics.
Within the taxonomy presented in Section 2.3, virtual extended enterprises can be
classified according to Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2 - Characterization of Virtual Extended Enterprises (VEEs) using the
taxonomy from Section 2.3
__uia~iiunuiumiasumuEIU~M~~H~[IMhI[I
Duration
Structure
Participation
Governance
Visibility
Coupling
Size
Medium to Long
* VEEs tend to be larger, long term projects that
justify the development of complex infrastructure
and partnering arrangements
Relatively Static
* Because VEEs tend to be long term, the
relationships tend to be more established, leading to
relatively static structures. Firms would only be
removed after repeated failures to perform and
efforts by the network to correct the situation.
Medium Exclusive
* Generally, participating firms have some loyalty
towards the center of the VEE, but there is rarely
any contractual basis for restricting firms from
participating with competing networks
Star-Shaped Governance Structure
* VEEs have a focal firm at the center, which usually
takes on governance of the network and many
network roels.
Medium High Visibility
* VEEs have a medium to high degree of visibility
through the network, usually enabled by IT. Lower
level suppliers will have access to higher level
information when needed.
Medium to Tight Coupling
* VEEs tend to be more tightly coupled than not,
establishing long-term relationships. Without this
tight coupling, they may be considered an ordinary
extended enterprise.
Medium to Large
* VEEs tend to be fairly large, as they encompass the
full supply chain of a long-term project or program.
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3 Chapter 3: Enterprise Network Integration:
Development, Barriers, and Enablers
Integration challenges for enterprise networks can quickly multiply in several
directions in the face of growing technological as well as organizational complexity and
also in the face of accelerating rates of technological change. Over the past decade, many
enterprises have struggled to achieve the promised benefits of achieving greater
integration internally, often having to cope with information technologies that have not
performed as promised, facing efficiency gains that have failed to materialize, and having
to overcome internal resistance to the adoption of new technologies by the various user
groups. This has long been the crux of the problem, preventing enterprise networks from
achieving a higher level of performance in their respective market segments: namely,
integration challenges have proven to be rather difficult, fraught with many barriers. It
has not always been clear where barriers to integration have simply held back large gains
and where integration has simply proven to be ineffective. To compound the problem, the
technology of integration has been evolving quickly, leading some to describe the
problem as "hitting a moving target." As such, the virtual, extended enterprise
architectures have not become prevalent in many complex industries today, and may well
not become viable until these barriers are gradually overcome and the benefits of
integration become more of a reality.
This chapter seeks to examine the most common barriers to integration across virtual
extended enterprises and to identify best practices and strategies for integration that
mitigate the observed barriers, increasing the likelihood of success in enterprise
47
networks. This discussion builds upon the foundational concepts outlined in Chapter 2.
The scope of this examination is not limited to purely technical or process-based
challenges, but is extended to include all critical barriers, be they technical or socio-
technical, such as organizational hurdles or strategic challenges. In practice, the non-
technical barriers often prove to be the most intractable and deserve special attention.
Further, the integration strategies developed for enterprise networks will be compared
with integration strategies for the single enterprise, on which considerable research
already exists. More importantly, barriers that are unique to the case of enterprise
networks will be given special consideration.
3.1 Background of Enterprise Networks and Integration Efforts
The field of study devoted to the understanding of enterprise networks and their
integration is relatively nascent, tracing its origins to the rise of information technology in
the 1980s and 1990s. Current studies focusing on the integration of enterprise networks
have evolved on the heels of the earlier research performed by those within the
information technology (IT) sector, concentrating on the integration of the internal
enterprise processes. The early work in enterprise integration focused on integrating the
IT requirements across a single enterprise unit into a unified, coherent system,
automating processes and combining them into unified operations through the
employment of common applications and standard interfaces. Examples include
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems and Customer Relationship Management
(CRM) suites(Cummins, 2002; Laudon, 2004). The scope of what constituted an
"enterprise" was often narrow compared to more recent definitions given in Chapter 2,
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and could be limited to the direct oversight of the program champion/sponsor, which
could be at a group, facility, program or division level, rather than at the larger enterprise
level (Murman, 2002). Much of the earlier work in enterprise integration focused on
developing new technologies for communication and sharing, including the development
of standards, protocols, and centralized data management such as ERP, CRM and Product
Data Management (PDM) systems. Early enterprise integration efforts made good
progress towards tackling basically a single dimension of a larger challenge, but this
seemingly lopsided approach often suffered from ignoring many of the strategic and
socio-technical aspects of integration, which are described below in greater detail.
3.1.1 Internal Enterprise Integration
Since the explosion of information and communication technologies in the 1980s and
1990s, firms have asked the basic question: "How do we take advantage of the many
disparate sources of information that we now have across our various applications and
databases to aid our decision process?" At the time, many firms had a treasure trove of
data spread out across many proprietary systems of varying vintage, but they did not
know how to effectively gather it in ways that could create new value for the firm. IT
experts termed this process of integrating data for management of the firm "enterprise
integration," as it gathered (integrated) information from across the enterprise in a
coherent fashion, allowing decision makers to have access to more information in their
decision making process. In the early days (and to some extent, continuing today),
"enterprise integration" was largely thought of in terms of IT only; it was often not a
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project that would involve top management, production workers, or knowledge workers,
and it did not necessarily alter business processes or long-term strategy.
After more than a decade of both academic research and real-world experience
with the challenges of integrating information systems throughout the enterprise, the
Enterprise Integration (EI) community has developed new technologies, tools, and
strategies for dealing with the challenge of aggregating and integrating the information
that exists across a single enterprise not only to provide new aggregations of data but also
to potentially serve as a springboard for transforming the fundamental business processes
that drive the enterprise (Cummins, 2002; Venkatraman, 1994). The term internal
enterprise integration will be used to differentiate the enterprise integration activities in
the single-firm enterprise from those in an enterprise network.
The meaning of the term "enterprise integration" in both the literature and in
common perception is slowly evolving from an information-centric view of integration to
a more holistic, enterprise-wide, view that incorporates strategy, organization, and
processes into the scope of integration. Many of those in the IT community have come to
see IT as a necessary and critical enabler of internal enterprise integration, but understand
that information and communication strategies alone cannot integrate the entire
enterprise. To successfully integrate across the enterprise, information systems and
technology must be aligned with business strategy, organization, and processes and
relevant stakeholders representing all of these areas must participate in the process.
Without these essential elements, the integration of information systems and technology
can provide only a minimal level of benefit to the enterprise, if at all, and will not provide
the level of impact that could fundamentally change business processes or the business
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itself. There is a litany of businesses that have unsuccessfully attempted technology-
centric integration strategies, only to later scrap the entire effort.
3.1.2 Early Integration Efforts: Lowering Transaction Costs Through
Technology
The explosion of IT and the proliferating means of communication in the 1990s
were expected to significantly lower the transaction costs of collaborative, networked
business arrangements by allowing quick and timely information transactions and more
coordinated flows of material. Transaction costs are any costs that are incurred in making
an economic exchange, ranging from direct costs, such as fees paid to those who move
information, to indirect costs, including time and effort to complete a transaction. Ronald
Coase's Theory of the Firm in 1937, followed decades later by Oliver Williamson's work
in transaction cost economics offered the beginnings of an economic theory of business
organization based on the concept of lowering transaction costs. This work suggests that
as transaction costs are lowered, businesses will seek standard materials and services
from those external to the firm if the costs of obtaining them externally are lower than the
cost of acquiring them internally, due to economies of scale enjoyed by outside producers
able to sell them to multiple customers (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975).
This idea is cited as being responsible for the waves of outsourcing and later off-
shoring of fairly homogeneous or standardized products and services that began in the
early 1980s. It is a very powerful idea that has to a great extent motivated the deployment
of IT systems in enterprises around the world in an effort to lower transaction costs,
expected to lower overall costs (production and coordination) and increase profitability.
The mantra of "drive down transaction costs at all costs" is dangerous if it leads to a
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myopic and short-term view of integration strategies, however. Transaction costs are a
very broad category of costs, and they can occur on different time scales. Some efforts to
reduce transaction costs can result in what is often termed the "J curve," or "worse before
better" behavior, where strategies will actually decrease performance in the short term,
but provide long term benefits, perhaps far in excess of the initial downturn. The
converse of this is a strategy adopted to reduce transaction costs in the short term that can
do long-term damage to the firm. When looking at transaction costs, a proper stance
should be to lower transaction costs, with a multi-scale perspective that leads to long
term, sustained growth.
This concept is not new, although it has not always been expressly articulated.
There have historically been collaborative networks that have used mutual trust and co-
location to lower the transaction costs and structure industries for long term, sustainable
gain. Although these practices pre-date transaction cost economics, they can be seen as
strategies that fall in line with its thinking.
3.1.3 Early Collaborative Networks
Just as it had opened doors towards the possibility of coordinated information
flow and integration across an individual enterprise in the early 1990s, information
technology and the Internet infrastructure breathed life into an older idea: collaborative
networks of enterprises. Networks of businesses, each contributing their core
competencies towards the creation of an end product in a coordinated fashion, have long
collaborated to bring a product to market. On small, regional scales, tight collaborative
networks of interconnected businesses with complementary skills have ruled many
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industries such as textiles and shoemaking for several centuries, and this trend is still seen
today in the mega-construction and auto industries of the 2 0th Century (Piore, 1984).
Many of these industries are interlinked through strong networks of trust, built on
relationships that have been forged on a personal level between family-owned and
operated businesses over many years. Others rely on trust that arises in small, close-knit
industries where reputation carries great weight. Some have pointed to the American
whaling industry of the 9th Century and later to early Hollywood studios as other very
influential industries that set both the business and legal precedents for collaborative
networks to emerge (Goranson, 1999). The level of trust exhibited in these networks
allows transaction costs to be lowered because accuracy of information can be trusted,
preventing information re-checking, and formation of networks are often free from
onerous legal burdens, instead relying on the good word of two individuals. These
networks, however, have long been limited by communication and coordination
requirements, and have been limited in the level of integration (especially technical and
organizational) they have displayed.
Collocation
Some industries and large producers saw the benefit of a more tightly integrated
network of enterprises working in concert, and sought ways to minimize communication
and coordination costs in order to develop closer, more integrated relationships. One
method of lowering these costs was to locate many parts of the network within close
geographical proximity to each other in order to facilitate the timely exchange of
information and material (Camarinha-Matos, 1999b). The most cited example of this
arrangement is Toyota's establishment of Toyota City, a campus of co-located suppliers
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developed as early as the 1950s to more tightly integrate suppliers for the purpose of
decreasing communication and coordination costs in the production of Toyota vehicles
(Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). Toyota's stance toward supplier relations was highly
advanced for its time, as co-location was not a common practice.
The Toyota network was not the first network to co-locate, however. Many
industries with collaborative networks throughout history have been highly concentrated
in a small geographical area, such as the textile mills or the cobbling industry of northern
Italy since the 15th Century, the 19th Century American whaling industry concentrated
overwhelmingly on Nantucket Island and New Bedford, Massachusetts, or the movie
production industry in Hollywood (Goranson, 1999; Piore, 1984).
Collocation often leads to fairly closed, static networks with high barriers to entry
and exit, where such a network has high asset-specificity-it requires a new capital
investment for facilities specific to supplying particular customers that would not be
optimal if an enterprise wished later to move out of the original network. Without
significant legal assurances, investment and strong leadership, this arrangement could
often prove to be impractical, especially in the very common case of volatile markets
without a very high degree of trust between firms.
Many enterprises are hesitant to co-locate without substantial, long-term, guarantees that
often are not possible in program-based virtual extended enterprises that will dissolve at
the termination of the program or project.
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3.1.4 IT and Transaction Costs
When properly applied, information technology can enable enterprise networks to
lower transaction costs due to information transfer between firms. Information can be
transmitted at minimal cost once the technologies are in place, and the speed of transfer is
almost instantaneous. The volume of information that can be moved at amazing speeds is
very large, and growing rapidly. Moving information is seldom a problem today,
however; understanding and processing the large quantities of data as well as packaging
such data in useful ways is now the greater challenge in managing the costs of moving
data. These challenges are large enough that many firms have actually seen increased
transaction costs as a result of implementing information technologies and systems that
were poorly planned and executed (Cordella, 2001).
Coase and Williamson predicted that as transaction costs are lowered, firms will
seek alternative structures in terms of relying on markets for obtaining materials and
services or producing them internally through vertical integration. Especially in the late
1990s, during the Internet "boom," many businesses assumed that by moving their
business online they would automatically lower their transaction costs. It was expected
that loosely-connected enterprise networks would quickly dominate the market in many
industries through the emergence of Business to Business (B2B) transactions. "Brick and
Mortar" enterprises, relying on traditional strategy assessments, were hailed as relics of a
past era. In retrospect, this did not, of course, come to pass. With the burst of the "Dot
Com" bubble in 2000, brick and mortar firms that had also embraced information
technology continued to do well as many of the "dot com" startups floundered. Michael
Porter argued that what many of these IT-centric firms failed to realize was that IT was
simply an enabler, not a substitute for a well-developed strategy based on established
55
principals and market analysis with the goal of long-term, sustainable competitive
advantage (Porter, 2001). By empowering both suppliers and customers with more
information, information technology (specifically, the Internet) can potentially weaken
the profitability of markets, according to Porter. He argues that successful companies,
and by extension, enterprise networks, will distinguish themselves through strategy, not
through price alone. Information technology is seen as a critical enabler of traditional
competitive strategies, not a wholesale replacement of them. Porter argues that successful
strategies enabled by information technology should be focused on interlinking activities
in the value chain-the set of activities through which a product or service is created and
delivered.
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The value chain, depicted in Figure 3.2, is a widely used basic tool to understand
the influence of new activities on an enterprise. It divides the activities of an enterprise
into "primary activities," including inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics,
marketing and sales, and after sales service, and "support activities" that each influence
the primary activities, including enterprise infrastructure, human resources, technology
development, and procurement. At the end is a profit margin, which is affected by how
well the enterprise executes is primary and support activities. The value chain concept
was developed in (Porter, 1985).
3.1.5 New Directions in Enterprise Integration Research
As the study of enterprise integration continued through the late 1990s and into
the new millennium, it became increasingly evident that enterprise integration, internally
or in a network, represents a much broader challenge than the adoption of information
technologies and systems alone. Consequently, research began to focus on such strategic
and organizational topics as business process alignment, organizational structure, socio-
technical interfaces within the enterprise, and legal concerns, as well as on larger, more
holistic, enterprise architectures. As the dimensions of the challenge faced in enterprise
integration expanded, the boundaries of the enterprise itself, too, became broadened.
Researchers in the area began to look more closely at the extended enterprise,
bringing both the supply chain and its customers into the picture (Murman, et al., 2002).
Greater emphasis was placed on the enterprise's position within the larger value chain
relative to its suppliers and ultimate consumers, moving towards a more holistic view of
how an enterprise creates and delivers value to its customers (Rayport, 1999;
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Venkatraman, 1994) and, more broadly, to its multiple stakeholders (Murman, et al.,
2002).
3.1.5.1 Interlinked Value Chains
The concept of "value chains", developed by Michael Porter, can be applied to
the analysis of enterprise networks that take the form of extended enterprises, and serves
as a useful visual model for understanding the various dimensions of enterprise
integration. Within an extended enterprise, there are many participants, each with its own
value chain with its own primary and supporting activities. When these value chains
operate in a synchronized fashion across an extended enterprise or even industry, they
operate as part of what Porter terms a "value system." Integration entails the proactive
efforts to coordinate, synchronize and even combine the primary and supporting activities
throughout the respective value chains of all the enterprises that are members of an
extended enterprise. Integration may be technical, in the case of IT, but also includes
restructuring of processes, establishing collaborative relationships and building strategic
partnerships.
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Figure 3.3 - Madnick's Interlinked Value Chains
Madnick has combined the concept of "value systems" with Porter's other widely
used tool for strategic analysis, the "five forces model" (Porter, 1980) to develop the
concept of interlinked value chains to visualize the role of integration between firms in a
network or across an industry (Madnick, 2005). An interlinked value chain analysis
places the values chains of a focal firm at the center, surrounded by the value chain of its
suppliers, customers, potential entrants, and one representing new technologies and
opportunities. This presentation includes the value streams of the entire extended
enterprise. Within this framework, shown in Figure 3.3, firms can develop and analyze
integration strategies by looking at ways to combine and streamline the primary and
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supporting processes between two value chains in the value system, combining the
outbound logistics of a supplier with the inbound logistics of a manufacturer, for
example. Integration strategies can also be pursued to block potential entrants or hasten
the adoption of new products. The concept of value systems and interlinked value chains
can serve as a simple, powerful mental model and visual aid to represent integration
strategies, and can be used to develop strategies that lead to sustainable, multi-scale
competitive advantage.
3.2 A Framework for ICT-enabled Enterprise Transformation
Perhaps the most well known framework developed for understanding the approaches
to and impact of using IT for enterprise integration and transformation in the broader
context was developed by Venkatraman (Venkatraman, 1994). This framework helps
one to understand both how the notion of enterprise integration has evolved (and
continues to evolve) as enterprises seek more benefits from their IT investment and
strategies, and presents a path that leads to the development of enterprise networks and
new business scopes flowing out of the efforts at integration within the single firm.
Venkatraman identified five levels in his framework-localized exploitation, internal
integration, business process redefinition, business network redefinition, and business
scope redefinition, each one providing increasing benefits to the enterprise. See Figure
3.4. Venkatraman refers to the first two levels of transformation, Localized Exploitation
and Internal Integration, as being evolutionary-that is, they build incrementally on the
original business structure and processes and do not significantly alter the enterprise in a
revolutionary way. They primarily build on integrating the many technologies across the
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Figure 3.4: Venkatraman's Five Levels of IT-Enabled Business Transformation
(Venkataman 1994)
enterprise, and could be considered analogous to the automation of processes already
in place.
At the lower two levels, enterprises often exhibit excessive focus on the technical
aspects of integration, such as technical interconnectivity and protocols for
communication, while paying less attention to achieving business process alignment by
using these technologies. Venkatraman recommends that enterprises focus on processes
and higher-level strategic issues, especially in the Internal Integration step, but has
observed that many enterprises become trapped in this step because they are focused on
the technical aspects without turning their attention to the larger enterprise-level issues at
stake to be able to take the next step towards revolutionary transformation.
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In the early years, the challenge faced by those in the IT-centric enterprise integration
community was primarily perceived as being technical in nature, because the most
difficult challenges then faced basically encompassed the task of aggregating disparate
data sources and tools, which were largely technical. The term "enterprise integration"
often meant data collection, compilation, tool alignment and compatibility, and did not
necessarily alter the business of the enterprise in a significant way. The term was
"owned" by the IT community, and the managers of the enterprise were happy with the
arrangement. The benefits that IT professionals promised enterprises could see from the
addition of IT in the early 1990s never fully materialized, however, and any competitive
advantage that integrated IT systems provided soon became eroded when all businesses
acquired the same basic capabilities for data integration (Cordella, 2001). Venktraman
refers to this early superficial level of IT-enabled transformation in the framework he
developed as "local exploitation" and suggests that it does not and will not provide the
revolutionary benefits that IT professionals promised(Venkatraman, 1994).
Beyond local exploitation, enterprises can integrate themselves internally, a level
Venkatraman terms "internal enterprise integration." At this level, enterprises tightly
coordinate their IT systems across all aspects of the enterprise, but also ideally with their
business strategy, processes, and address socio-technical concerns as part of a larger
integration effort that goes beyond "islands of success." Despite this intention for a
larger sense of integration, many enterprises working on internal enterprise integration
often fall short.
The last three levels are "revolutionary" levels, which leverage IT together with new
processes, strategies, and ultimately the business models of the enterprise to provide a
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long term, competitive advantage. In Venkatraman's framework, enterprises should
determine which level would best suit their goals, given the effort required to achieve
each level. Today, a decade after his framework was published, very few enterprises have
progressed to the higher revolutionary levels that are described. Most enterprises today
have an understanding of the second level, internal integration, and many enterprises
have attempted business process redesign with varying success. Some firms, such as
those in the aerospace defense community, have been forced by their business
environment to pursue business network redesign and are making some progress, but they
are still struggling to identify strategies and architectures for enterprise network
integration that are effective enough to deliver truly revolutionary capabilities. The
barriers to such transformation remain high.
3.2.1 Learning from Internal Enterprise Integration: Barriers to
Enterprise Network Integration
There is much to be learned from the obstacles encountered and the work done to date
on enterprise integration in the single enterprise, and there is a logical extension of many
of these ideas to the case of enterprise network integration. Many of the barriers to
integration are common to both the single enterprise and the enterprise network. Indeed,
internal enterprise integration poses many very similar challenges, especially if disparate
subsidiaries or an acquired external enterprise are being integrated with a pre-existing
enterprise. Often, many of the technical requirements in large, multi-divisional, single-
firm enterprises are just as complex as in enterprise networks. Integrating and sharing
data over disparate databases and design tools, semantics issues and many of the
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organizational challenges of integrating distinct cultures and processes in large single
enterprises that have grown trough acquisition can bear a striking resemblance to the
same issues faced in enterprise networks. Any work in understanding the barriers to
integrating enterprise networks must also look to those first encountered by enterprises
tackling their internal integration issues.
The key point of departure for enterprise network integration from internal enterprise
integration lies in the issues of central authority and allegiance. In the case of internal
enterprise integration, there is a central authority, such as the corporate headquarters, that
can hand down directives and control funding for activities and capital expenses.
Additionally, within the single enterprise, there is only one primary organization to which
allegiance can be owed (although often rivalries between various business divisions for
resources can be intense, the issue of enterprise security between divisions is not as
common a phenomenon'). In the case of enterprise network integration, there is no such
central authority, and integration initiatives across a network are rarely funded by a
central source. Allegiance can be divided between the parent enterprise and the network-
based project, and therefore the level of trust in communications throughout the network
is lower than within the single enterprise, raising the need for providing data security and
protecting intellectual property. These two issues can give rise to related issues in other
areas, such as those involving leadership and coordination, but most new obstacles can be
One possible counterexample to this general observation is the case of a multi-program
defense company with heterogeneous security requirements between programs. For
example, the military government customer may require that information must be kept
within the boundaries of a particular program, even within the same company which may
be engaged in other programs, sometimes for the same customer. In this sense, there may
be a higher contractual obligation for allegiance and security to the program rather than
the corporate enterprise.
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traced back to these two critical issues (Camarinha-Matos, 1999d). Much of the technical
design, ideas and strategies developed for internal enterprise integration also can be used
to guide thinking on the choice of technologies and strategies towards the integration of
the enterprise network as a whole, provided that certain key differences pertaining to such
factors as centralized control and allegiances are considered and addressed.
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4 Chapter 4: Common Barriers to Integrating Enterprise
Networks
Enterprise Network Integration is a multi-dimensional undertaking that requires
significant levels of both technical and non-technical effort in order to achieve success.
An important part of the challenge is to overcome the barriers and challenges to
integration. Technical hurdles can often be anticipated, as they are easier to "see" in the
planning stages: either there is a protocol for information sharing or there is no such
protocol. While many technical barriers to integration can prove extremely challenging,
they can usually be anticipated and can be proactively addressed. Both the academic
literature and the practical experiences of third parties selling their technical solutions to
enterprises concur on this point. However, non-technical hurdles, which can broadly fall
into categories of strategic and organizational barriers, are comparatively harder to
anticipate. Nevertheless, they must be anticipated and mitigation measures must be
aggressively pursued, as they can have an equally devastating effect on the outcome of
any integration effort. Such a proactive approach is necessary since strategic and
organizational barriers have often been the ultimate cause of failure for many very large
internal enterprise integration efforts in the past.
Many of the most common barriers to Enterprise Network Integration are listed below
in Table 4.1, organized into technical, strategic, and organizational categories. Within
these categories, particular types of barriers that are wholly unique to enterprise networks
are italicized.
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Table 4.1 - Common Barriers and Challenges to Integrating Enterprise Networks
U
Technical
* Toolsanddata
sources can not
always be
standardized across
network
* Identifying standards
for data exchange and
tool interoperability
where possible
* Maintaining a reliable
infrastructure for
communication
* Semantic resolution
(data)
Strategic
* Maintaining balance
between network and
firm allegiance
* Financing network
infrastructure
* Assessing and sharing
risk and liability in the
network
* Lackofframeworks
for cooperation
(security standards,
legal standards, etc)
* Establishing control
and decision making
in the network
U~~~~~~
Oreanizational
* Integrating, aligning
and motivating distinct
cultures with
conflicting incentives
in a single direction
* Mismatches between
organizational and
technical architectures
* Developing cultures
that can handle high
clockspeed change.
* Semantic
resolution(process,
organization)
* Data and process
ownership disputes
The following sections will discuss the barriers to enterprise network integration,
divided into technical, strategic, and organizational categories. Special attention will be
paid to barriers which are wholly unique challenges faced by enterprise networks, while
barriers that are also faced in internal enterprise integration will receive less emphasis.
4.1.1 Common Technical Barriers to Enterprise Network Integration
The integration of Enterprise Networks in complex industries would simply not be
possible without the technology provided by information and communication systems.
Even as technical systems have developed over the last three decades into usable,
deployable systems at a rapid pace, the demands of business have continued to push the
boundaries of technology even faster. The Information Revolution has ushered massive
changes in the workplace, as fast-paced changes in the available technology have given
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rise perhaps to as many problems as they may have solved. New developments in
technology have no doubt served as a catalyst for the information revolution and have
brought staggering progress in terms of connectivity and Internet-enabled information
infrastructure systems. Still, these systems continue to present both challenges and
barriers for those wishing to achieve enterprise integration, particularly in the context of
integrating disparate legacy systems and sustaining the installed infrastructure to maintain
and enhance their capability.
Figure 4.2 - Categories of Technical Barriers to Integration. Adapted from Madnick
and Wang, 1988
Madnick and Wang describe four categories of technical barriers to integration:
Knowledge, Information, Connectivity, and Interface. See Figure 4.2. Although this
framework was developed to address internal enterprise integration concerns, its logic
can be readily applied to the enterprise network case. The four categories of technical
barriers, as they can been seen in the diagram, are not meant to be mutually exclusive and
may overlap somewhat. Individual barriers can have elements of any of these four
categories, and generally grow in difficulty as the overlap increases, causing more
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"tangled" technical problems. The most tangled technical problems at the core involve
what Madnick and Wang term "knowledge and information delivery systems"-the
systems at the heart of enterprise network integration. Many of the technical challenges
that lie in only one category, such as database management systems or networking, are
topics of broad field of academic inquiry and technology development, and therefore are
diminishing as barriers to integration and the technologies mature.
The following sections will highlight these four categories of technical barriers, and
discuss common enterprise network integration barriers that apply to each category.
4.1.2 Informational Barriers
Information barriers are often very clear-cut obstacles: Information is stored in
many disparate, heterogeneous systems across the network, but these systems cannot
necessarily physically communicate with each other. They may be made by different
vendors, employ different technologies on different platforms, or adhere to a different
standards or protocols. Additionally, data semantics remain a towering issue: how can
one ensure that distributed systems that belong to different organizations but carrying the
same name mean the same thing? How can one be sure that the information that is found
following a search of the sources on the network is really the information that is being
sought?
These technical barriers are common to virtually all enterprises, whether they are
working in a network or not. These barriers are present right along with legacy systems
that must interact with newer systems, with systems deployed by separate divisions in a
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corporation, in divisions acquired through acquisition, and in enterprise networks, where
each enterprise may be using a system that best meets its own particular internal needs.
In modern enterprises in complex industries, the nature of data itself is changing
as well. The data that must be shared and integrated are no longer limited to text and
numerical data stored in relational databases-they include a plethora of application data,
such as CAD solid models, visualization files, or simulation experiments, and process
data, bill-of-materials, and related data residing at different locations and on different
platforms. Unless applications and databases adhere to market standards for data
exchange, applications cannot be guaranteed to seamlessly exchange data "out of the
box." "Wrappers," pieces of middleware written to translate data from one application or
database format into that of another, must be written for each possible combination of
application or database to allow to the exchange of data. There does not-and probably
will not-exist a commercially available wrapper for bilateral communication between
any given pair of applications or databases that need to be integrated. This problem grows
geometrically for linear increases in the number of applications to be integrated.
In internal enterprise integration, a prevailing wisdom is to standardize as much as
possible on systems and protocols: databases and tools should run on common platforms,
relational databases should come from the same vendor, etc. This is the wisdom behind
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) suites-they unite several systems and software
packages under a single umbrella, with the promise of ease of data exchange and
integration throughout the system without the extensive need for wrappers and
middleware. ERP systems are ideal implementations-systems built from scratch based
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upon newly developed processes, replacing rather than accommodating legacy systems
and disparate systems across the enterprise.
In the case of enterprise networks, however, this cannot be the case. The members
of enterprise networks are autonomous business units that all have distinct core
competencies and contrasting requirements arising from the diversity of their work. It is
almost certain that there will be heterogeneous systems across an enterprise network to
complement these heterogeneous competencies. Unlike the case of internal integration, it
is extremely difficult to convince enterprise network members to adopt common
information tools, as there is no central authority with budgetary power providing
incentives to do so. In some cases, if the investment is small enough or if the enterprise
network is sufficiently long-lived, it may be economically beneficial for all parties in an
network to standardize on information technology, especially if there are not compelling
reasons why members need distinct systems. This is the exception rather than the rule,
however. This forces would-be network integrators to look for other approaches to
information integration that do not require standardization on information storage and
retrieval technologies.
4.1.3 Knowledge Barriers
Knowledge barriers are problems that involve having the right knowledge in place
to perform a task at hand. Often, these issues involve semantics-understanding what
data and processes from heterogeneous sources really mean and knowing where they are.
This overlaps strongly with many of the connectivity barriers. As an example, a very
active knowledge barrier is the disconnect that can exist between product definition,
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process definition, and knowledge management systems. Many processes require the
knowledge contained in all three areas, but these systems have traditionally remain
disjointed with little integration between then, forcing users to switch from system to
system to have the knowledge necessary to complete a process or task.
Another kind of knowledge barrier is to understand where knowledge resides
across many data sources, either internally or across a network. Often, data exists in the
network but the barrier to locating it is sufficiently high that it may be easier to replicate
it that to find it. While this class of barriers is not unique to enterprise network
integration, its difficulty is compounded by the variations that exist in capturing, storing,
and searching for knowledge across the network.
4.1.4 Connectivity Barriers
Connectivity barriers exist in two forms: physical connectivity and logical
connectivity. Physical connectivity refers to the physical ability to communicate data
across a network using hardware, while logical connectivity refers to the ability to
logically connect data in meaningful and useful ways in software.
4.1.4.1 Physical Connectivity
While physical connectivity was a major concern as recently as a decade ago, the
current information infrastructure in most of the developed world is quite good, and there
is currently a large amount of excess capacity in many networks. The key to the decline
in physical connectivity barriers has been the phenomenal success of the Internet, and
more specifically, the TCP/IP protocol architecture for data exchange over packet
switched networks. The TCP/IP Protocol architecture is a layered architecture that
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addresses transport control and internet addressing of data sent over a packet-switched
network. The Internet also embraces several standards for the physical layer (signal
conversion and transmission, such as the actual cables used as well as the routers used to
relay packets) as well as the network access layer (Ethernet) and application layers(email,
HTTP, FTP). Virtually all modern hardware and software support this architecture, which
drastically reduces the physical connectivity barriers and costs of the past when
coordinating communication between two locations. The protocol can be run over the
public Internet, or it can be used on private wide-area networks to increase available
bandwidth and security, even using other custom developed application layers. The
Internet's TCP/IP protocol and architecture has become the lowest common denominator
that almost all people who wish to communicate data embrace.
TCP/IP is not always ideal for every application, however, and it is not without
limitations. It does not guarantee latency causing real-time transfer of data such as audio
or video to be poor, and the number of available addresses is fixed and the available pool
is shrinking, for example. There are new versions of the TCP/IP, such as IPv6 (Internet
Protocol, version 6) waiting in the wings, as well as another transmission layer protocol,
known as Asynchronous Transmission Mode (ATM) that promise to address many
weaknesses of the current Internet transmissions. ATM has already been deployed in
many Wide Area Networks by enterprises seeking its low latency and higher transmission
rates and is a proven technology. By continuing to embrace these standards, physical
connectivity barriers will remain low even in across highly varied enterprise networks.
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4.1.4.2 Logical Connectivity
Unlike the rapid advances made in physical connectivity, logical connectivity
remains a very large and daunting technical barrier to enterprise network integration.
Physical connectivity answers the question "How do I get data from point A to point B?"
Logical connectivity answers the questions "What is the data that I need, how does it fit
together, and what does it mean?" Logical connectivity includes semantics, data
location, query decomposition, and data translation. Logical connectivity barriers are
very often highly intertwined with information, knowledge, and interface barriers, and
can be the sticking points making the other barrier technically intractable. The keys to
overcoming logical barriers to integration are protocols and standards. Often, however,
those protocols and standards are either non-existent, they favor one party over others
leading to dispute, or there is no clearly defined solution that works well for any party.
One of the first logical connectivity barriers encountered is that of incompatible
data formats. This barrier, like many connectivity barriers, is present in many integration
efforts. Fortunately, although it can be daunting, it is fairly straightforward barrier and is
easily anticipated. Most computer users are familiar with this problem if they have ever
received a computer program written for a different version of software they own, or for a
different computer platform than the one they are on. In the case of enterprise data, the
number of formats used for data exchange can be prohibitively many, requiring
companies to have many data filters and versions of software available. Conversions
from one data format to another might not always be possible, or may be fraught with
semantic difficulties. Upgrading software out of sync can result in incompatible files
between two companies that may have good reasons to stand by the version of software
that they are using.
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The issue of data semantics is a very large barrier to all forms of enterprise and
data integration, and its importance only grows as enterprises attempt to share data with
ever-increasing complexity. Whenever data is collected from many sources, semantics
will be an issue because to date there is no universal, mature technology that ensures
semantic compatibility in data that flows across system boundaries. Without semantic
resolution, massive amounts of data cannot be efficiently and meaningfully exchanged,
unless strict standards are imposed on the enterprise network that increase ease of
integration at the expense of innovation and flexibility from network members that can
no longer use the tools and processes that are most beneficial to them. Semantic
integration offers a way for heterogeneous data to exist in an integrated environment
without draconian standardization of tools and processes.
There is no standard way of ensuring that two network members mean the same
thing when they use the same tags to define their data or to perform an automatic check
to see if the data from all sources are presented in the same units, for example. Further,
semantic misunderstandings are difficult to predict a priori without a significant amount
of upfront work.
Semantic misunderstandings in data can cause a tremendous amount rework after
they are subsequently discovered, and in some cases, can lead to total system failure if
not uncovered in time. A key example of a semantic failure leading to a system failure
was on the Mars Climate Orbiter program, a $125 million dollar spacecraft that was lost
in 1999 because of a semantic issue-one thruster design team worked in metric units,
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while another collaborating design team worked in English units. The semantic error
resulted in the spacecraft entering an unstable orbit and crashing into Mars2.
The issue of data semantics is the topic of several large research studies, notably
the "Semantic Web" being developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
together with academic and industry partners3 . Semantic Web seeks to create the
framework and tools that will one day allow most things on the World Wide Web to be
viewed with context, allowing for seamless integration of all forms of data on the Internet
across all boundaries. Context gives data a well-defined meaning that allows computers
and humans to interact more meaningfully with data. Although the ambitious project is
not yet near its ultimate goal of a fully context-aware world wide web, it has developed
several tools to date that have become useful to those trying to integrate data sources,
most notably the Extensible Markup Language, (XML), and its framework for semantic
integration called the Resource Description Framework (RDL).
4.1.5 Interface Barriers
The last category of technical barriers to integration is interface barriers: how
should integrated data from many very different sources be presented to users for
meaningful consumption? This, like physical connectivity, is an issue shared by all
integrative efforts. Interface barriers include access issues: users should be able to easily
2CNN.com, "Metric mishap caused loss of NASA orbiter." (September 30, 1999).
Accessed from http://www.cnn.com/TECH/space/9909/30/mars.metric.02/ on May 2,
2005.
3 See "Worldcl Wide Web Consortium: Semantic Web," http://www.w3c.org/20001/sw/
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access all pertinent information at the location it is needed without having to switch
systems of views.
Additionally, interface barriers can include security elements: what data are
allowed to be presented to what user? This is an aspect of technical interfaces that is
much more relevant to the enterprise network case, because the network consists of
autonomous businesses with proprietary knowledge in each project. Internally,
companies want this available, but do not want it available to the network, even as the
network has access to much of the other project data. As employees are moved around
and temporarily collocated with employees of other businesses, they need access to
proprietary data, while the next person may not need or may be denied such access. Some
of these issues are also present in enterprises that must maintain high security around
their projects, whether for competitive advantage or at the request of the customer. In
sensitive projects, employees must have access to information on a "need to know" basis,
hiding information that they are not authorized to see, limiting the enterprise's
vulnerability to security breaches.
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5 Chapter 5: The Joint Strike Fighter Program: A Case
Study of Integration in a Large, Complex Extended
Enterprise
5.1 Introduction
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the program enterprise network that is
designing and manufacturing it are both often heralded as a prime examples of complex
engineering systems due to the myriad dimensions and layers to the complexity and the
overwhelming scale of both the aircraft and the program extended network behind it. The
JSF, a next-generation fighter aircraft currently under development, is a very ambitious
program; it is designed to replace at least six other dedicated fighter and attack aircraft in
their specific roles across the US and international armed services. It must do so with
increased effectiveness and reduced costs compared to the aircraft it is replacing, while
engaging not only the American aerospace industry, but also the aerospace industries of
our allies. To date, there have been over 3,000 aircraft ordered at an estimate price around
45 million dollars per aircraft, which would make it the largest and most expensive
defense acquisition program in the history of any nation.
While the external appearance of the aircraft seems in line with past and present
fighter aircraft designs, the JSF represents a radical departure from traditional fighter
aircraft. One of the most technically challenging aspects of this departure was the
decision to design the fighter in such a way that would allow it to be built on a common
platform into one of three variants: a conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) version,
an aircraft carrier based version (CV), or a short take off and vertical landing version
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(STOVL). Thus, one basic aircraft design could be used across many services and
missions, in theory reducing acquisition and support costs.
The JSF is also being developed in a very new way after a string of troubled
aircraft acquisition programs including the A-12, Comanche, and F/A-22, which were all
based on arms-length contracts between suppliers and a prime contractor laden with very
detailed, specific requirements with limited flexibility. The US Department of Defense is
holding the JSF up as its flagship of acquisition reform, throwing away very lengthy
requirements documents in favor of performance-based goals that treat cost as an
independent variable in the design. Of particular interest, the prime contractor has
decided to design this aircraft using a highly-integrated enterprise network consisting of a
core of highly-connected, closely coupled partners working side by side on design, with
an extended supply chain network that is integrated using information and
communication technologies to bring them closer into the design processes and give them
more autonomy in the design of their subsystem.
The degree of integration and collaboration across a network of enterprises on a
project of the scale of the JSF is a first for the military aerospace industry, and all eyes
are squarely on it. The JSF Enterprise Network is forging new ground, and has
uncovered new barriers to integration and is working on tomorrow's enablers for
enterprise networks in high-clockspeed, complex products. Thanks to the complex array
of stakeholders involved, the barriers to integration encountered have covered a broad
spectrum, covering technical, strategic, and organizational barriers. For this reason, the
JSF Enterprise Network is a prime candidate for a case study into the barriers and
enablers to integration in complex enterprise networks. The project is relatively new and
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is evolving, so the barriers are still fresh in the minds of those working on the project, and
many still pose problems. If the JSF program is successful, it will become a textbook
example of an advanced complex engineering system that has satisfied the often-
conflicting needs of many stakeholders using an enterprise network.
The following chapter details a case study of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Enterprise Network, based on multiple site visits and dozens of interviews with people
responsible for shaping the enterprise network and working within it. The chapter will
begin by placing the JSF aircraft and enterprise network in context, and place it within
the taxonomy and frameworks for enterprise architectures from Chapter 2, followed by a
stakeholder analysis throughout the program. After exploring the history and creation of
the program, we will go through the barriers and enablers to integrating the JSF extended
enterprise using the framework developed in Chapter 3.
5.2 System Context
The United States has largely defined its military power since World War II in
terms of airpower. In the years immediately following the war, there was a large
explosion in the number of aircraft designs, with each aircraft designed to fill a very
specific niche, such as high altitude strategic bombing, fighter escort, or close air support.
In the following decades, especially as the capability of avionics and mission hardware,
increased, there was a reduction in the number of aircraft designed for such narrow
missions. This generalization of roles is perhaps most apparent in the evolution of fighter
and attack aircraft.
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Figure 5.1 - Augustine's Law. Source: (Struth, 2000)
Over this period of time, the cost of developing new fighter aircraft has grown
exponentially, in large part due to the ever-increasing complexity of the avionics
packages in these aircraft and the onerous requirements placed on the contractors who
build these systems. In what has been termed "Augustine's Law," after Norman
Augustine, former chairman of Martin Marietta, if trends continue, it will take the entire
defense budget to purchase a single fighter aircraft in 2054(Fallows, 2002). See Figure
5.1. As can be seen in the figure, one of the goals of the Joint Strike Fighter is to break
Augustine's Law by dramatically reducing the cost of each copy of the aircraft. Taking a
lesson from the F-16, one of the ways this cost-reduction will happen is through large
economies of scale and use of existing technologies in the design. A way of increasing
economies of scale would be to have a single aircraft for all branches of the US armed
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services that fly fixed-winged aircraft, as well as by selling as many as possible to our
allies. The use of existing technologies limits exposure to technical risk, hopefully
avoiding both schedule and budget overruns. One other major area for cost reductions
could potentially come through an overhaul of the defense requirements process, making
the process less of a burden on contractors. To accomplish these goals, the JSF would
need to be developed with the needs of many stakeholders in mind, in a highly technical,
ICT supported environment.
The 1990s saw the birth of joint operations doctrine in the US, when both
technological and political advances allowed the various branches of the armed services
to begin working more closely together to provide a seamless military. In the 1996
document Joint Vision 2010 and the subsequent 2001 document Joint Vision 2020, the
US DOD laid out its intentions for a high degree of cooperation between the services on
the battlefield, involving the fusion of command, control and communications across all
of the services and weapons systems. Further, it saw as a goal greater cooperation and
communication with allied forces. This would allow, in theory, for pilots to communicate
with ground troops and even other allied forces instead of relaying messages back to
base. A key element in this vision was commonality across services to reduce confusion,
acquisition costs, and coordination costs. The concept of a Joint Strike Fighter fell
squarely within this vision-a common platform for all services that would meet their
collective need for an effective, affordable strike fighter. If successful, the JSF will fit
well into the context of each service's force structure, as well as the DOD's larger vision
for the future of joint battlefield operations between services and with other allies.
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There are no current plans to build any other manned fighter aircraft, so it is likely
that the Joint Strike Fighter will be the last manned fighter built in the US, as unmanned
combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) are maturing at a fairly rapid pace, and have already
recorded their first kills in combat before the JSF had finished its critical design review.
Because it is likely to be the last fighter of its kind, the entire military aerospace industry
scrambled to get on board. For many, there was a feeling that if they were not able to get
on board the massive JSF program they would be forced to leave the industry, as only a
very few aerospace companies have experience with unmanned aerial vehicle design and
system development. Additionally, unmanned fighters may require much less
engineering and design work because they do not have to take into account the safety of
and interaction with the pilot, which drives down profitability. More importantly,
unmanned aircraft remain an unknown, with much uncertainty. The industry will shift,
and the JSF represents the last opportunity to work on a major program under the known
paradigm of manned fighters. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the projected budgets for
acquisition (Figure 5.2) and for research, development, testing, and evaluation (Figure
5.3) for all military fixed wing aircraft over the next 25 years. The Joint Strike Fighter (F-
35) is soon projected to capture the vast majority of all work in the industry.
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5.3 The History of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
The origins of the Joint Strike Fighter can be traced back to 1993, when in the wake of
the Cold War the Department of Defense under Dick Cheney conducted a very thorough
Bottom-Up Review that concluded that the DOD should "continue the ongoing F-22 and
F/A- 18E/F programs, cancel the Multirole Fighter and the A/F-X programs, curtail F-16
and F/A-18C/D procurement and initiate the JAST Program"(Rand MR1559). The Joint
Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program was designed as a technology incubator to
develop technologies for future use in a jointly developed strike fighter, which would
serve the strike needs of the services at a much lower cost than that of other cancelled
programs. At the earliest stages, the necessary concepts and technologies were developed
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to further the specific concept of a single fighter that could meet the needs and goals of
the joint services through high commonality. Other programs, such as the
DARPA/USMC Advanced Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) study and
the Air Force's Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF) were also rolled into
the program the following year.(Rand MR1656).
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Figure 5.4 - The Evolution of the JSF Program
In 1994, the DoD embarked on a wave of acquisition reforms and decided to
make the acquisition of this new aircraft the flagship of the reform initiatives by taking
six key steps to increase the affordability of the new aircraft: ensure commonality
between variants, change the acquisition cycle to spend more time in "concept
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development," make the requirements process more iterative, seek out international
cooperation in development, create proactive technical and programmatic risk reduction
programs, and use competition as a means of selecting a best design. The Concept
Development phase was a 5-year period of time when contracts were awarded to four
firms to develop their own concepts for how they would meet the JIRD goals (Struth
2000, GAO / T-NSIAD -00-173).
In December 1994, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Northrop
Grumman were selected to create conceptual aircraft during a 15 month Concept
Definition and Design Research period. McDonnell Douglas and Northup Grumman
decided to team their efforts, but soon Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas, hampering
that effort. After several rounds of design reviews in 1996, Lockheed Martin and Boeing
were selected as the two prime contractors that would move forward into the next phase,
Concept Development (CDP). Beginning with CDP, Lockheed Martin officially teamed
with Northrop Grumman and British Aerospace (later renamed BAE Systems). During
this time, the project was officially renamed the Joint Strike Fighter(Birkler, 2003).
The Concept Development Phase is perhaps one of the most well-known and
exciting aspects of the Joint Strike Fighter Program. Each team developed and
demonstrated their own prototype aircraft to prove how their design would meet the goals
developed for the aircraft. The Boeing version of the JSF was given the designation the
X-32, and the Lockheed Martin version was given X-35(Birkler 2001).
The next four years brought a very bitter rivalry head to head, as each JSF team
essentially competed for survival in the market. It was known at the time that this would
be the largest contract in military history, and that in all likelihood there would not be
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another manned fighter built. The outcome of the decision could very possibly determine
who would stay in the business, and who may have to bow out. In addition to the large-
scale fight between the two dominant prime contractors, many larger suppliers began to
soon partner with one of the two, betting on their own future as well.
It is interesting to note that although the actual concept and performance-based
requirements of a joint fighter was the same for both entries into the JSF competition, the
resulting aircraft, the X-32 and X-35, were surprisingly different. The only major
common design component that the designs featured was a Pratt and Whitney F 119-
derivitive engine, which was successfully used on the F/A-22. Many of the major
subsystems, notably the STOVL lift system, employed vastly different technologies and
alternative designs. Boeing relied on a direct lift ducted exhaust system, much like an
updated, advanced version of the system used by the AV-8B Harrier. Lockheed Martin,
in contrast, opted to use a proprietary lift fan system that blew cold air from behind the
cockpit, originally developed as part of the DARPA/UMSC ASTOVL program from the
early 1990s. The exhaust of the engine is also directed downward via a 3 bearing exhaust
nozzle (Beliquva, 2004).
In addition to competition on technical performance, the two teams also had to
compete on their support and logistics infrastructures, their manufacturing processes, and
their supplier networks and partners. Both teams invested heavily in IT solutions that
could coordinate the virtual design of the aircraft, coordinate supplier access to designs
and track common parts and variant parts for each design. A significant advantage went
to the program that could prove that they had a robust enterprise network, capable of
staying on budget, on schedule, and handling technical and programmatic risk. Each
90
enterprise network competed as a team, and had to prove that not only did they posses
first rate core competencies spread across the network, but that they also could work
effectively together.
Cooperation was not only a technical asset, but also a political one. As this was
such as massive military project, many congressmen were keenly interested in getting
some part of this program in their district. As with previous large budget government
programs, there was pressure to spread the work out geographically, necessitating the use
of IT to coordinate design, process, and manufacturing. At the same time, there was
pressure from the Joint Program Office to work with international partners in the project.
The idea was that in exchange for providing funding for the development phase of the
aircraft, international companies within sponsoring countries would be allowed in on
several aspects of the design and would be allowed access to some of the technology
developed on the program. Lockheed Martin already had an advantage when working
with international partners, as they had extensive experience developing the wildly
successful F-16 variants for sale to foreign nations, as well as helping other countries
develop indigenous aircraft, such as Japan's F-2. It was during this time that each
program architected their extended enterprise, which will be studied later in this chapter.
Over 2000 and 2001, there were many publicized tests of the two experimental
aircraft. The X-32 was the first to fly. Dubbed the "Flying Frog" or "Monica" by
Washington insiders, Boeing developed a highly unusual looking aircraft with a delta
wing and a large, downward reaching air intake just under the nose. The X-32 went
through its flight tests with minor hiccups. The Lockheed Martin X-35 was second to fly.
The X-35, with a much more conventional-looking airframe, demonstrated the merits of
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its lift fan system by being the first aircraft in history to take off, break the sound barrier,
and then land vertically using the same aircraft (Baliquva, 2004).
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Figure 5.5- The X-32 Propulsion system (left) and the X-35 propulsion System.
Source: Brig. Gen. Leslie Keene: "Designing the Joint Strike Fighter" Slide
Presentation.
Figure 5.6 - The X-32(1) and X-35(r) Source: JSF System Program Office
On October 26, 2001, the DOD announced that Lockheed Martin had won the
contract to continue on to the System Design and Development (SDD) Phase. According
to Pete Aldridge, the Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, the X-35 (to be renamed the
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F-35) was the clear winner of the competition on several dimensions. It was widely
thought that the largest advantage came from the technical design on the lift fan system.
The contract was awarded, and Lockheed Martin began an immediate ramp-up to fully
develop their aircraft (Birkler 2003).
In the three years since the SDD contract award, the F-35 has suffered a few
setbacks, most notably a weight problem and some dissatisfaction from international
participants. It became apparently in 2003 that the STOVL version of the F-35 would be
around 6% over its projected weight, decreasing its range and weapons carrying capacity.
While many critics panned the program, the Lockheed Martin team worked to alleviate
these problems, both by making subsystems lighter but also by pushing back against the
customer requirements to see if they could be modified in ways that would allow the
team to make weight saving changes to the design. One such change included making the
weapons bay slightly smaller, which would prevent the JSF from carrying all ordinances
in the inventory, but in the end it was decided that this change would not significantly
impact the effectiveness of the aircraft. In August of 2004 it was announced that the
STOVL version was now at its desired weight, and that weight reducing efforts on
common F-35 parts had resulted in the CTOL and CV versions of the aircraft to come in
under their projected weight, increasing their range and performance.
Another setback was that the JSF program decided to postpone the Critical Design
Review, originally scheduled for April 2004. Most people at the program felt that the
original CDR timeline was unrealistically aggressive, and that the program should have
been immediately rebaselined at the start of SDD. It did not appear to surprise many
people when the decision came to postpone CDR to allow for the final design to become
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more stable. This was a lesson learned from
CDR before the design was entirely stable.
problems with its design, which caused a
slippage.
the F/A-22, which pressed ahead through a
As a result, the F/A-22 was plagued with
massive amount of re-work and schedule
The current schedule for the F-35 features a first flight by a CTOL variant in
2006, with aircraft entering service in 2008. Full Rate production of the F-35 will begin
in 2012, with a peak production of 206 per year. The last JSF will be ordered by the US
and Allied Forces in 2026 (RAND MR 1559).
5.4 Stakeholder Analysis
The Joint Strike Fighter Extended Enterprise is comprised of hundreds of companies
working together towards a common goal. This section will examine the major
companies within the network, abstractly depicted in Figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.7 - A depiction of the JSF Extended Enterprise. The supply chain continues
down at least two more tiers.
5.4.1 Joint Program Office
The Joint Program Office, headquartered in Arlington, VA, is the "voice of the
customer" in the JSF program, and also serves as a directorate for the entire program,
sharing responsibility for the program with the Lockheed Martin. It is staffed with
personnel from the Air Force, Navy, and Marines Corps. The Joint Program Office
(JPO) is directed by the Program Executive Officer, a flag officer either from the Air
Force or the Navy, with this position rotated between the two services. The Program
Executive Officer reports to a civilian Service Acquisition Officer from the other service.
The JPO is composed of 16 separate integrated program teams (IPTs) that oversee the
production and design of the entire system, and interface with the contractors and the
public, and ensure that the program is on target to meet expectations. The sixteen IPTs
are:
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* Air Vehicle * Operations
* Autonomous Logistics * Verification and testing
* Propulsion * International
* Air System Integration * Contracts
* Air System Engineering * Business and Finance
* Air System Requirements * Security
* Air System Logistics * Public Affairs
* Air Systems Production · Legal
It is obvious from the list that the JPO sees the JSF as a complete air system, paying
special attention to areas that were previously neglected in the design stages, devoting
high-level teams to such areas as Autonomous Logistics, Air System Production and Air
System Requirements. They also manage the international interface of the program as
well as monitoring the security, public relations, and legal aspects of the program as a
whole.
The goal of the JPO IPTs is to provide a uniform face to the customer, avoiding
many customer and management problems in previous multi-service programs with
conflicting opinions from a disjoint customer base, such as the TFX program.
Additionally, the JPO sought out international participation in the program, and laid the
foundations for international participation. They monitor several metrics required by law,
such as contracts awarded to foreign companies and number of contracts awarded to
small-businesses, and often interface with lawmakers inquiring about the program.
5.4.2 Prime Contractor - Air Vehicle
After a four-year competition, the Lockheed Martin proposal for the JSF was
chosen by the JPO, and a 10-year award for the System Development and Design (SDD)
phase was awarded to Lockheed Martin, making them the prime contractor for the air
vehicle (the propulsion system is handled via separate contracts from the JPO). As such,
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Lockheed Martin, together with the JPO, is ultimately responsible for the success of the
aircraft and all supporting systems necessary for it. The primary headquarters for the JSF
is the Lockheed Martin production facility in Ft. Worth, Texas. The Ft. Worth plant,
featuring a mile-long moving production line, is the manufacture facility for the forward
fuselage, wings, and leading edges on the aircraft, as well as the site of final fabrication
for the aircraft. Additional manufacturing work is done at the Lockheed Martin facility in
Marietta, Georgia.
In addition to manufacturing, the Ft. Worth facility is headquarters of the
engineering design effort and program management. Ft. Worth hosts many project-wide
Integrated Product Teams composed of employees from many across the JSF project.
Many partners and suppliers, both domestic and international, have employees co-located
in Ft. Worth working on the JSF. Lockheed Martin is involved in some way in the design,
manufacture, and support of every major subsystem on the JSF.
Ft. Worth is also the center of IT integration efforts across the entire program, and is
home to the master copies of the program databases and the central program servers.
Many partners, suppliers, as well as the JPO have dedicated landline connections to these
central resources maintained by Lockheed Martin.
5.4.3 Prime Contractors - Propulsion
Pratt & Whitney, based in multiple sites across Connecticut, is the prime
contractor for the development of the F-135 engine for the JSF. Pratt & Whitney works
directly with the JPO as the primary contractor for the propulsion and interfaces its work
with Lockheed Martin. They also must interface their efforts with Rolls Royce, who is
developing the lift fan, clutch, roll posts, and three bearing exhaust nozzle for the F-35B
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STOVL version of the aircraft developed for the USMC and the UK. They also work
closely with Hamilton Sundstrand, who is developing the engine control systems. Pratt &
Whitney is responsible for all integrative efforts on the propulsion systems for the JSF.
General Electric (GE) teamed with Rolls Royce and has a prime contract from the
JPO as the alternate propulsion supplier for the F-35. In 2002, they formed a limited
liability corporation (GE Rolls Royce Fighter Engine Team, LLC) to produce their
engine for the JSF, the F-136. Rolls Royce, in addition to development of the common
STOVL hardware that will also work with Pratt & Whitney's F-135, is also developing
the low-pressure turbines in the F-136. GE is designing and manufacturing the high
pressure counter-rotating turbine and afterburner systems.
5.4.4 Major Partners
Lockheed Martin has two principal partners working closely with them on the
Joint Strike Fighter: Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems. These three companies had
worked together on the JSF proposal for many years previous to the award of the JSF
contract, and together they form the nucleus of the Joint Strike Fighter Enterprise
Network. They are highly integrated and densely interconnected with respect to this
project, having formed several integrated project teams with members from all three
companies and sharing in production of the largest subsystems on the JSF.
Northrop Grumman is a company that has developed several notable aircraft, such
as the B-2 Stealth bomber, F-14 "Tomcat" naval fighter. They have valuable experience
in designing low-observable aircraft, in working closely with the Navy, and with fire
control radars, avionics, and mission system software. Northrop Grumman involves four
of its seven divisions on the JSF: Integrated Systems, Mission Systems, Electronic
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Systems, and Space Technology. Of these, Integrated Systems has the largest share or
work designing and manufacturing the mid-fuselage, weapons bay, and missions systems.
Another major component is the Fire Control Radar system, a descendant of systems used
on the F-16 and F/A-22, which is developed by Electronic Systems. Northrop Grumman
is involved in many of the systems of the JSF, often in conjunction with Lockheed
Martin, such as on the Electro-Optical Targeting System, or on the Electronic
Countermeasures with BAE Systems. Northrop Grumman has facilities involved with
the JSF in Baltimore, Maryland, Reston, Virginia, and in E1 Segundo, Palmdale and
Redondo Beach, California.
BAE Systems is an international aerospace company based in Samlesbury in the
United Kingdom. They were the developers of the Harrier, the world's most successful
vertical takeoff and landing fighter aircraft. They bring extensive experience not only
with VTOL, but also in working with European markets and projects that the US firms
are not comfortable with or have no experience with.
The aft fuselage and the empennage of the F-35 are designed and built at the
production facility in Samlesbury, with additional manufacturing work done at the
facility in Wharton. BAE Systems is also taking a lead role in the development of the
Electronic Warfare capabilities and the Vehicle Management Computer of the JSF out of
its facilities in Nashua, New Hampshire and Rochester, England and Edinburgh,
Scotland. Other work includes STOVL testing, autonomic logistics, and preventive health
maintenance.
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5.4.5 International Partners
There are currently nine countries other than the US that are participating in the
System Design and Development stage of the JSF. The goal of their participation, from
the point of view of the United States, was to attract investment, lower unit costs through
economies of scale, increase interoperability between allies, leverage foreign
technologies, and to promote foreign sales of aircraft (JSF Oral Testimony, 7/21/2003).
International participants are organized into three tiers, with different privileges
on the program corresponding to the level each country has invested in the program. At
the highest tier, Tier I, there is a single country-the United Kingdom. The UK has
invested over 2 billion US dollars into the project, and is allowed the deepest access into
the program of any foreign country as a result. They have a deputy at the JPO that reports
directly to the Program Executive Officer, unlike other countries that must report to a
JPO deputy for International Affairs. They are given 10 full time staff positions at the
JPO, including the deputy directorship of the Systems Engineering IPT. They are given
priority on acquiring aircraft from production, and can share in profits made off sales to
non-investing countries.
At the second tier, there are two countries-Italy and the Netherlands,
contributing approximately one billion and 800 million US dollars, respectively. They
report to the JPO international director, and are given multiple full time staff positions at
the JPO (5 and 3). The Tier III countries include Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark,
and Norway, each contributing between 175 and 125 million dollars. They each receive
one full time position at the JPO, must report to the JPO International director, and may
receive aircraft in a priority commensurate with their investment(GAO. For a full look at
the contributions and expectations of each international participant, see Figure 6.1.
100
Additionally, there are two countries, Israel and Singapore, that have not invested
enough in the program to be considered partners, but do receive the right to some
program data for purposes of evaluation for suitability, and will have purchase priority
over other countries that have made no investment at all.
5.4.6 Supply Chain
The Joint Strike Fighter, as mentioned earlier, has an international supply chain
that is centrally managed by the prime contractors (primarily Lockheed Martin), and
selected for providing "best value" to the program. "Best value" is never clearly defined,
but it is assumed that many factors can be taken into the value proposition besides
monetary value, such as strategic value or political value. The majority of the supply
chain is widely distributed across the United States and the partner countries, rather than
centrally located near the major manufacturing centers of Ft. Worth, Southern California
and Samlesbury, UK.
The US aerospace industry intentionally has distributed itself geographically over
the last several decades to shore up political support from local congressmen eager to
keep jobs in their districts. While this dispersal makes programs within the industry more
robust to political pressures, it also creates higher transaction costs between firms, as both
communication and transportation of materials is made more difficult. See Figure 5.8 for
a map of major JSF suppliers in the United States to Lockheed Martin.
The supply base of the Joint Strike Fighter is extremely eager to be on board the
program, as the JSF is possibly the last manned tactical fighter to be built, providing a
"make or break" scenario with respect to the tactical fighter business. This is especially
critical for those who are not well diversified with business in other sectors of the
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industry. Those that make it on board can possibly look forward to up to three decades of
contracts and stability in the future.
The JSF program plans on using their supply chain in new ways, involving them
more up front in the design work, and also allowing them to add more value to the
program by delivering entire subsystems, rather than components designed to
specifications. This also provides a further incentive for companies to become part of the
JSF Program Supply Chain, as it will give them experience with higher technologies, new
design methods, and more advanced tools.
at~.>~~ ~~~~~ ff~~~~~RMMRI&
Lockheed Martin JSF Suppliers
Figure 5.8 - Major Suppliers to Lockheed Martin in Ft. Worth. Source: Rand Report
MR 1559, originally from Lockheed Martin.
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5.5 Classification of the Joint Strike Fighter Program as An
Enterprise Network
The Joint Strike Fighter Program is a prime example of a modern enterprise
network in a complex technical environment. Of the various varieties of enterprise
networks defined in chapter one, it most resembles an Extended Enterprise, with a
closely-held core group of participants composed of the prime contractors and principal
partners, and then the extended supply chain and customers, linked into the core
enterprise (composed of Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems) via an
ICT infrastructure with a high degree of communication and integration along critical
paths through the value stream. While normally extended enterprises have a single
dominant firm with an integrated, cooperative supply chain, the JSF Extended Enterprise
has a nucleus of dominant firms forming the core enterprise, led by Lockheed Martin.
This is in contrast to virtual enterprises, which tend to be highly dynamic and more
loosely coupled, or alliances, which tend to have very low coupling, very loose
governance structure, and involve few participants. The key aspects that make the JSF
program enterprise an extended enterprise rather than a traditional enterprise with a
coordinated supply chain is the nature of the relationships and the degree of connectivity
between suppliers. The relationships are cooperative, and there is a high degree of
interaction, both electronic as well as physical between the primes and the lower-tier
suppliers. Design is done collaboratively, and suppliers are involved at many levels,
from design of components to design of the autonomous logistics required to keep the
aircraft operational.
Figure 5.9 provides an idealized graph view of the JSF Extended Enterprise. From
a graph theoretic prospective, the JSFEE is a rough hierarchy with the special property
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that it possess both intra-level and inter-level links between nodes. Nodes on the same
level, such as first tier suppliers, may work together on subsystems that are provided to
the prime contractor, and many second or lower tier suppliers have visibility extending up
through to the primes. This multi-level linking, as opposed to hierarchical dyadic links, is
a characteristic of extended enterprises.
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Figure 5.9 - The JSF Extended Enterprise classified using the Enterprise Network
Taxonomy developed in Chapter 2.
The JSF Extended Enterprise (JSFEE) can be classified as follows within the
taxonomy presented in Chapter 2. Figure 5.9 depicts this classification graphically on a
radar chart with these dimensions as the axes.
Duration: The JSFEE is a long-term enterprise network, with a projected lifespan
of approximately 30 years. As such, much time can be devoted to network
formation and selection of network members. Because of its duration and size, a
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large amount of resources can be invested in the enterprise network's
infrastructure and tools, which will be able to amortized over a long period of
time.
Structure: The JSFEE employs a fairly stable structure, without a high degree of
dynamism. Contracts are in place to define roles over the life of the program.
There is a high degree of trust in the network allowing for strong, stable
relationships to be built. It would likely take a gross breach of contract to have a
member removed from the network, as others in the network, especially the
primes, would likely first try to rectify any problems and get the network member
back on track.
Participation: The JSFEE network does not necessarily display exclusivity, but
there are exclusive aspects to it. A member of the network is not contractually
obligated to avoid work with competing projects, such as one managed by
Lockheed Martin's rival, Boeing. The aerospace industry is small enough that
this is not possible to do, and most wise companies try to work on several
programs concurrently. However, there are exclusivity requirements placed on
JSFEE participants forbidding them from taking the knowledge or technology
they have gained working on the program and applying it to other programs they
may be working on, either individually or as part of another enterprise network.
Governance: The JSFEE displays a hybrid structure when compared to
governance structures developed in Chapter 2. It is most like a star-topology
structure, with the prime contactor for the airframe, Lockheed Martin, at the
center, which makes most large decisions regarding design, sourcing, and
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strategy. Lockheed Martin, however, is not the only prime contractor-both Pratt
& Whitney and the GE/ Rolls Royce team also have prime contracts and manage
separate sections of the extended enterprise. Above the three prime contractors is
the JSF Program Office, which does monitor the actions of the primes and can
direct them to change course, and has ultimate authority on matters. Close to
Lockheed Martin are the principal partners, who have a very significant say into
the design, and often work very close and in tight collaboration with Lockheed
Martin. Below these principal partners are second tier and third tier suppliers, who
are also integrated, at varying levels, into the extended enterprise. These lower
level network members are consulted on design, and often work together to
provide system solutions to the primes and principal partners.
Visibility: There is much more visibility in the JSFEE than many previous
aerospace programs. Suppliers often are able to see up several levels to see how
their component fits into the larger system, and they are allowed access to much
more information than they have been previously in the name of increased
visibility to decrease inefficiencies and rework due to poor information.
Coupling: Compared to all previous aerospace programs, the JSFEE is very
tightly coupled. The extent to which responsibilities are shared and fates
intertwined has never been as high. As such, there is a high need to commonality
across the network, and there are fairly stringent requirements for data exchange
and tools use.
106
Size: The JSFEE is a massive enterprise network, composed of hundreds of
participating enterprises with up two hundred billion dollars worth of business
over the projected lifetime of the program.
5.5.1 Roles within the JSF Extended Enterprise
The JSF Extended Enterprise is a very large enterprise network, and it should not
be surprising that there are a number of roles within the network that allow it to function
smoothly. The JPO and Lockheed Martin hold the most important roles within the
extended enterprise. The JPO serves as the customer, auditor, and performs some of the
work of the network coordinator and broker of the network, using the terminology for
enterprise network roles developed in Chapter 2. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, the
prime contractor of the air vehicle, holds the majority of positions within the network. In
this capacity, Lockheed Martin serves as the network coordinator, broker, and program
manager. Both Pratt & Whitney and the GE / Rolls Royce team also perform these
functions, but their scope is limited to the area of propulsion. Under the new model of
acquisition, Lockheed Martin has a great deal of flexibility and autonomy to run their
extended enterprise as they see fit, although the JPO does serve in an oversight and
advisory role, and may occasionally step in to make their wishes known. A separate
division of Lockheed Martin, Lockheed Martin Information Systems, provides the role of
Network Coach, developing the networked infrastructure and specifying how companies
across the JSFEE will interact electronically.
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5.5.2 Lifecycle of the JSF Extended Enterprise
The JSF Extended Enterprise was formed beginning in 2001, after the contract
for the 11-year System Design and Development Phase was awarded to Lockheed
Martin. Although at the time of the contract award Lockheed Martin had already formed
a close partnership with Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems, the rest of the extended
enterprise had not been formed. After contract award in October 2001, there was a flurry
of activity around the creation of the extended enterprise, selecting suppliers, defining
relationships and processes between suppliers, the primes, and the JPO, as well as rolling
out the ICT infrastructure throughout the extended enterprise. The first six months of this
process could be considered the creation phase of the extended enterprise.
Although the first six months were the most hectic in terms of creation of the
JSFEE, new suppliers continue to be brought into the extended enterprise four years after
it was formed, as the entire program continues to operate and evolve as the design
matures and prototypes are built. At the present time, there is no set date for the
dissolution of the JSFEE. After the F-35 JSF aircraft are delivered to the US and allied
forces, other countries are likely to purchase additional aircraft, keeping the production
lines open. The JSFEE would like to follow in the footsteps of the F-16, originally
designed in the early 1970s, which has had foreign sales push aircraft production forward
decades after the US acquisition was finished with new and more advanced designs.
After the final orders for F-35 aircraft are filled, the JSFEE will dissolve, although there
will likely be support contracts with foreign militaries after the production lines stop.
The IT infrastructure had not been implemented, most contracts for subsystem
and components had not been awarded, and no integration had taken place. As part of the
competition for the JSF contract, Lockheed Martin Information Systems had developed
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an integrated virtual work environment, which integrated tools and data in a central
location that would be accessible by the entire extended enterprise. Although the system
had been developed, it had not been deployed or field-tested at the time of the contract
award. In all past military contracts, there was a period of time, usually about six
months, between the award of the contract and the time the contract was funded.
Lockheed Martin had planned to use this time to plan the deployment and field testing of
the IT infrastructure and selected design tools, debug potential problems, and carefully
develop the architecture for their extended enterprise. To the surprise of Lockheed
Martin and the rest of the industry, the contract was funded the day after it was awarded,
forcing them to immediately begin forming their enterprise network and installing the
infrastructure necessary to run it.
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6 Chapter 6: JSF Integration: Barriers and Enablers to
Integration across the JSF Extended Enterprise
The Joint Strike Fighter extended enterprise has encountered many integration
challenges as it has sought to design and manufacture the F-35 fighter using new
strategies, many new technologies, and innovative organizational structures. Its massive
size and multi-decade duration mean that its enterprise integration strategies for its
diverse network of companies will have a very deep and lasting impact on the enterprise
integration strategies across the aerospace industry, so it is fitting that this program be
studied in greater detail.
This chapter explores the barriers to, and enablers of, integration experienced by
the JSF extended enterprise as the program evolved its current enterprise network. The
data in this chapter were collected in the course of two rounds of semi-structured, not-for-
attribution interviews with key personnel working on the program at Lockheed Martin's
Ft. Worth, Texas design and production facility, as well as with individuals via
teleconference and telephone interviews at other locations in the JSF extended enterprise.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, these interviews were conducted with individuals with very
high-level visibility into the JSF extended enterprise, covering the heads of program
management, engineering, material management, system architecture, manufacturing, and
information systems for the JSF program, focused on the air vehicle platform (this
includes all aspects of the program for which Lockheed Martin has responsibility as the
prime contractor). These interviews represent the views of specific individuals from
across the extended enterprise. Where these views reflected sharp differences on some of
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the key issues explored, they are noted in the course of the discussion presented below.
This chapter will focus on common themes that emerged from these field interviews.
These common themes are structured around strategic, technical, and organizational
integration issues, based on the framework for common barriers to enterprise integration
presented in Chapter 3. Barriers to enterprise integration identified in the literature that
have been observed to be present in the JSF program are highlighted. In addition, other
challenges that are specific to the JSF enterprise, and by extension to the military
aerospace industry, such as restrictions on technical collaboration with international
partners, are underscored.. Each section will conclude with enterprise integration "lessons
learned," enablers broadly applicable to the section that were brought out in multiple
interviews.
6.1 Introduction to Enterprise Integration across the JSF
Extended Enterprise
There was a tremendous impetus for enterprise integration throughout the JSF
program. During the JSF competition in the Concept Development Phase, Lockheed
Martin looked to its extended enterprise as a source of competitive advantage against
Boeing's proposal, just as it would look to its technical design of the F-35 as a source of
competitive advantage. Both Lockheed Martin and the Joint Program Office (JPO) saw
strategic teaming with Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems, as well as the extensive
international collaboration on the JSF program, as a great asset. As one interviewee
explained, however, such a teaming arrangement can also be perceived as a "teaming
penalty": by partnering with a number of major aerospace supplier companies, Lockheed
Martin would stand to benefit from the experience and expertise of other programs in
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which these companies might be involved. However, Lockheed Martin would also pay a
price for such a partnering arrangement in the form of having to coordinate the resulting
greater complexity of interactions between itself and various members in the network as
well as among the various partnering members themselves, in a wide spectrum of areas,
ranging from tool interoperability to semantics and security. The benefits of partnering
do not come for free. The challenge that Lockheed Martin faced was not just to overcome
this "teaming penalty," but to enable the extended enterprise as a whole to perform in a
way that is greater than the performance of the sum of its individual parts. The traditional
approach to enterprise integration has typically been to use technical integration as a way
to simply lower transaction costs across the network by using information technologies
and systems within the context of existing structures and processes. Often, this has had a
positive short- to medium- term effect, and the overall impact on the performance of the
extended enterprise over a longer period has largely been incremental.
Lockheed Martin desired to go beyond simply minimizing transaction costs, and
made the decision to view integration as a strategic capability. The systems, policies
and structures in place for integration had more to do than simply reducing or minimizing
transaction costs to ensure that networked structures are economically feasible- these
had to enable the extended enterprise to behave in revolutionary new ways that would
allow it to operate as a single entity, focusing on its performance over multiple time
scales-short-term, medium-term, and long-term. This reflected a new mental model of
the entire enterprise network reflecting a new enterprise architecture, helping to evolve a
coherent set of strategies and technical, as well as organizational, components working
together in concert. This entailed a fundamental redesign of the enterprise network,
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enabling it to perform much more efficiently and effectively over the longer run than the
traditional prime-contractor-sub-contractor relationship. In a way mirroring
Venkatraman's framework using information technology for business integration and
transformation, (as outlined in Chapter 3), the JSF extended enterprise looked beyond
evolutionary gains from information systems integration (Level 2) and instead used
enterprise integration as a vehicle for revolutionary change and fundamental network
redesign (Level 4), closely involving strategy and organizational structures with its
technical systems. Many aspects of the way traditional companies within the aerospace
industry work together need to change for this approach to come to full fruition, and the
undertaking continues to be non-trivial. The following chapters outline these integration
challenges for the extended enterprise, divided into categories of strategic, technical, and
organizational barriers and enablers.
113
114
7 Chapter 7: Strategic Integration on the JSF Program
The primary idea underlying strategic integration in an extended enterprise is to
interlink the value chains of organizations within the network, streamlining the value
stream from material acquisition to product delivery, allowing product to flow smoothly
through the value chain. Interlinking the value chains within the extended enterprise
includes aligning stakeholders, building trust, opening up processes, identifying
opportunities for elimination of redundant or non-value-added activities, and learning to
successfully work within external regulatory environments. The JSF program has faced
many of these strategic barriers as it has attempted to guide a very large extended
enterprise through rocky relationships, international politics, and a highly restrictive
regulatory framework.
7.1 Inter-firm Alliance, Allegiance, and Trust
One of the initial challenges for Lockheed Martin when it sought to assemble an
extended enterprise was building allegiance between firms that were often in direct
competition. The F/A-22 Raptor, an advanced fighter designed in the 1990s and early
2000s, was originally intended by the US Air Force to be a collaborative program, with
work shared between Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and General Dynamics (which Lockheed
Martin subsequently acquired). According to those interviewed at the Ft. Worth site
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where major components of the F/A-22 are designed and built, the reality of the F/A-22
was that the program had low mutual allegiance and trust between its major partners.
Lockheed Martin and Boeing did not intimately collaborate on this highly technically
integrated aircraft, and were hesitant to share technical or process data. A major driver
behind this lack of tight cooperation was the JSF Concept Development Phase
competition, in which the two companies were competing head-to-head in for the award
of the JSF contract. It is difficult to closely cooperate on one project while ruthlessly
competing for another simultaneously, even if efforts are made to erect internal inter-
program barriers. The F/A-22 suffered many delays over its development, and several
interviewees pointed to the lack of program integration in the project stemming from trust
issues between the major partners in the highly technically integrated project.
Lockheed Martin had several advantages on the JSF extended enterprise it did
not enjoy on the F/A-22 program. When forming the JSF team, it could pick and choose
its partners to ensure compatibility on the program, rather than being forced to
collaborate with a major competitor. Additionally, many firms in the industry saw the
JSF as a "make or break" proposition. Because the JSF is likely to be the last manned
fighter aircraft built in the US, companies were eager to become involved with the project
in order to stay in business in the industry. The JSF program is the largest defense
program in history, and it has generated many potentially lucrative, long-term contracts.
This forces smaller companies to be more amenable to change and new ways of operation
if it means that they could be a part of a successful 25-year program. In this sense,
perhaps ironically, desperation can be a vehicle for building trust.
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To both build trust and to increase the flow and quality of information across the
network, Lockheed Martin made the decision to populate the program's Integrated
Project Teams (IPTs) with personnel from across the extended enterprise and to have
many domestic as well as international partners co-located at its Ft..Worth facility.
Lockheed Martin opened leadership roles across the extended enterprise for non-
Lockheed Martin employees. As a prominent example, the head of the Air Vehicle IPT,
one of the largest and most important IPTs on the program, is a Northrop Grumman
employee. One co-located non-Lockheed Martin interviewee acknowledged that these
practices greatly influence his daily work, as he felt that he had a very strong allegiance
to the JSF program, and often thought of the program's concerns before thinking of his
own company's concerns.
The strategies that drive both co-located and intermixed teams have proven to be
successful enabling strategies to build trust and allegiance necessary for successful
enterprise integration, but they do not come without cost. Intermingling of the IPT
workforce, and especially collocation of foreign nationals, bring increased security
burdens to the enterprise, and law requires that separate databases and associated
networks be installed for the use of these employees and that access by these employees
be limited to these particular data sources.. These technical requirements will be further
examined in the Chapter 7, which addresses technical integration.
7.2 International Stakeholders
A key feature of the Joint Strike Fighter JSF Program is the presence of
international partnerships during aircraft development. Many interviewees pointed out
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that these international partners were a very necessary aspect of the program. In addition
to providing expertise on technologies such as Short Take Off / Vertical Landing
(STOVL) and experience with other fighter programs, the countries of these international
partners also represent other markets for the F-35 in the future through foreign military
sales (FMS) and help to shield the program from political attacks and budget reductions
within the US, as the program's international alliances carry additional weight with
Congress. From the point of view of the US Government, the involvement of the
international partners and its investments in the program mean that the acquisition price
per aircraft for the US should be lowered due to foreign investment and economies of
scale. Additionally, allied forces with similar weapons systems should be able to fight
more effectively alongside US forces in the case of allied campaigns. Although there are
many benefits to including international partners on the JSF program for the US, the
barriers to integrating these international partners into the program remain high and
costly. In particular, there are two large strategic obstacles: ensuring value for the
international participants to keep them satisfied with the arrangement, and US security
regulations on the transfer of sensitive technologies to foreign nations.
7.2.1 The International Value Proposition
The countries that invested in the JSF did so to gain access to technology, have
some say in the development of the aircraft, to lower the cost of acquisition, and
importantly, to allow companies in their own countries to be considered as potential
suppliers for the program. With the exception of a very small number of highly
specialized parts, all contracts are awarded on a value basis to companies in countries
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that have invested in the program. Unlike many other international aerospace programs,
especially those in Europe, which guarantee that contracts will be awarded in proportion
to investment or other offsetting contracts, there are no such guarantees in the JSF's
Memorandums of Understandings that have been signed between the US and each partner
nation. The prime contractor determines its suppliers based on the apparent value that the
supplier brings to the table. In this scenario, it is possible for countries that have made a
significant investment in the JSF to receive fewer contracts than they might have
expected in return if their businesses cannot provide a persuasive value proposition to the
JSF program. The US knows that these countries expect a return on their investment.
According to the General Accounting Office, "These countries expect to realize a
significant return on their investment in the form of JSF contract awards to their defense
industries. To meet these expectations, the JSF program office has encouraged the three
JSF prime contractors-Lockheed Martin, Pratt & Whitney, and General Electric-and
their suppliers to provide opportunities for companies from partner countries to bid on
contracts(GAO-04-554)."
119
Contribution of Countries towars System Design
and Development of the 3SF
1 United Kingdom
Itaty
Netherlands
Turkey
mAustrala
I Norway
I Denmark 
M Canada
USFiue . eCntriutns ofprnrntostwrd- h ytmDsg n
Figure 6.1 - The Contributions of partner nations towards the System Design and
Development Phase of the F-35. Data Source: GAO-04-554
Contracts Awarded as of 2004
0%
251
m United States
U United Kmgdom
Other Partners
Non-Partners
Figure 6.2 - Contracts Awarded during SDD, as of December 31, 2003. (GAO-04-554)
120
00-0.f
%
F-35 Subcontract Dollars Awarded per
Development Dollar Spent
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
n A%u.-
0.2
A
United States United Kingdom All others
Figure 6.3 - Return on Investment as of December 31, 2003 for the SDD phase. Not all
contracts have been awarded under this phase, which will last until 2012. (GAO-04-
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While the Buy American Act, 41 USC Sections 1 Oa - 1d, stipulates that at least 50
percent of any material acquired by government programs must be acquired through
domestic sources, the JPO has applied for a waiver under the public interest exception
clause (GAO-04-554), allowing it to let this percentage sink below 50%. Although the
primes are actively seeking out international suppliers, many nations are still not seeing a
favorable return on investment, although not all contracts have been awarded. This has
been a cause of great frustration for many of the international participants, especially in
the popular press that sees JSF investment as a waste of money if it does not guarantee
jobs at home. Australia and Norway, in particular, dealt with loud opposition in their
press in 2004, although much of the uproar died down in Australia as contracts began to
materialize in 2005. See Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.
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In recognition of many of the difficulties faced in keeping the international
partnership strong and in order to ensure that participants are satisfied with their
investment, Lockheed Martin made the decision to redefine the role of the former
program manager of the JSF, Tom Burbage, by appointing him to serve in a new role as
the Vice President for JSF Program Integration, where he closely works with
international partners. Lockheed Martin and Burbage have taken an active role in US and
internationally to maintain these strategic partnerships. As an example, in June 2005,
Lockheed Martin warned the EU that if it were to follow through on a plan to lift arms
embargos on China, there would be repercussions on the JSF program, because the US
Government would likely retaliate against European suppliers, which would hurt the JSF
partnership.
7.2.2 Technology Transfer Challenges
A second major strategic integration concern in relation to international partnerships
is learning to work successfully within the United States' restrictions on the export of
technology to foreign nations. The US export control regime's rules are governed by the
International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR), US Code Section 2751. The industry
has often called these rules onerous and even counterproductive:
"The purpose of licensing military equipment appears to have gotten
lost in the bureaucratic maze and has grown so cumbersome,
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complex, and slow that it is generating tensions with allies and
degrading the competitiveness of the US defense industry.4
ITAR was at the center of recent efforts to overhaul US export control laws by the US
Congress (notably Senate Bill 147 in 2001), but these efforts stalled in the wake of the
attacks of September 11, 20015. In its place, the current laws in effect "effectively tighten
restrictions on high-tech exports to the detriment of US competitiveness abroad without
enhancing US national security."6 There is no doubt that export controls export controls
are needed by the US; the central point of contention is the bureaucracy and inefficient
controls that accompany it.
The current export control regime severely limits international involvement in the
development of the JSF, because it places many technical aspects of the aircraft, such as
almost any piece of computer code, completely off limits to international sharing, while
the JPO is simultaneously pushing for increased international collaboration. The law is
very complicated, difficult to understand, and at times ambiguous, further hampering
efforts to involve international partners because it often takes a significant amount of
time to understand what the law actually requires. The penalties for breaking these
export control laws are very severe. Consequently, international collaboration is usually
avoided in any remotely questionable "grey" area in order to steer clear of any potential
legal troubles with the US Government. An interviewee mentioned that Lockheed Martin
4 "The Export Control Project of the Center for Strategic International Studies." <
http://www.csis.org/export/projdescript.htm> (accessed May 9, 2004)
5 Gary G. Yerkey, "Rep. Drier Says Prospects for Passage of Export Control Legislation
Not Good," 20 Int'l trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 664 (Apr. 17, 2003)
6 Nathan T.H. Lloyd. Rebuilding a Broken Regime: Restructuring the Export
Administration Act, 37 Vand.V and J. Transnat'l L. 299 (2004).
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has an entire office whose sole job is to interpret ITAR and ensure that the extended
enterprise is in compliance with it.
One particular difficultly is that a few international partners, most notably the UK-
based partner companies such as BAE Systems, desire access to the technical plans and
software code of the aircraft, to allow for the opening of a second manufacturing facility
in the UK and also to allow for future maintenance operations to be performed within the
UK which would avoid sending the aircraft across the Atlantic for their maintenance in
the United States. At the 2005 Paris Air Show, the UK hinted that it may pull out of the
JSF program if it does not receive greater access to design data for the F-35 in the future.
One option noted by Mike Turner, the head of BAE Systems, was instead to enter into a
partnership with France and Sweden on the development of an unmanned combat aircraft
known as the Neuron. 7
General Jeffery Kohler, director of the Department of Defense's Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, noted, "A lot of partners don't seem to quite understand that this
isn't an old-style airplane program. This is not an offset program or an industrial
development program that awards contracts in return for funding." "The US isn't in a
position to say you've invested a bit so here you go, here are the blueprints to the Joint
Strike Fighter." According to Alexandra Ashbourne, a defense analyst who heads
London- based Ashbourne Strategic Consulting Ltd., "There is a huge amount of
frustration about the lack of progress on this issue. There is real resentment within the
7 "U.K. shouldn't expect technology access on JSF, officials say." Published June 16,
2005. Bloomberg News Service, Bloomberg.com.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000102&sid=akMVFuWO09vo&refer=uk
Accessed June 17, 2005.
8 Ibid.
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UK government that despite being the most loyal ally in Iraq, we have nothing to show
for it."9
Lockheed Martin and the JSF extended enterprise have been active politically,
lobbying for changes to the law to make it easier to work with while still retaining, if not
improving, national security objectives.. In one example, Lockheed Martin has lobbied
Congress for an extension to the so-called "Canadian Exemption", which exempts
Canadian citizens from many of the requirements of ITAR. The JSF program would like
to see these exemptions applied to the UK as well, especially as the US has been
increasingly collaborating with the UK in many defense-related areas, notably the recent
war in Afghanistan and Iraq, as noted above. The US Congress is hesitant to approve any
legislation that could be perceived by the public as relaxing arms export controls in the
current political climate and has largely blocked these efforts. Many of those interviewed
felt that this situation is not likely to change, and, if anything, the controls will only
become tighter in the short- and medium-term future.
The influence of ITAR extends beyond what foreign nationals are allowed to see
while working on the program. It governs the work environment, the computing
environment, and policies for collocation. Examples of these barriers mentioned in
interviews include restricting foreign nationals from entering into buildings to work
overtime, requiring a separate computer network that needs to be maintained for their
work, and there is now a six-week minimum term for co-located foreign nationals, as any
shorter duration makes going through the legal hurdles necessary for collocation not
worth the effort. There are often tendencies to want to create "US -only areas" that are
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free of the obstacles for integration. Taken together, interviewees have pointed out that
the job description for many foreign nationals is often "fuzzy and ambiguous," as their
roles within this structure are still evolving. This has led to what one person termed
"successful ambiguity," because to date they seem to have seemed to found ways to make
this work.
The legal environment created by ITAR has led to a phenomenon known as
"information hiding" within the program. Often, foreign nationals are not outwardly
denied requests for information or data-instead, nothing appears to them when
searching or making inquiries. This has the effect of telling a foreign national that there
is no information, leading them to possibly re-do the work or re-acquire information that
has already been assembled, creating wasted rework leading to schedule oscillations
known as "design churn, "which makes many of the efforts of international employees
especially inefficient. The problem is exacerbated when design documents incorporate
information that foreign nationals can and should be able to see with some that they are
not, which restricts the entire document.
The phenomenon of information hiding has been observed in many complex product
development processes, even within a single enterprise without these restrictions. In these
situations, most often information hiding is not intentional and is instead the result of
asynchronous information exchange(Yassine, 2003). In the case of ITAR restrictions on
the JSF program, information hiding is intentional, exacerbating the problems of design
churn, leading to a great deal of waste with international partners. At least one of the non-
American interviewees pointed out that this was a problem that he and other foreign
employees faced.
126
An effective strategy that those in the JSF Extended Enterprise have found to work
within ITAR while avoiding design churn and the inefficiencies of information hiding has
been to rigorously separate technical, restricted data from its non-technical, unrestricted
parts. By having design documents issued as a bundle of restricted and non-restricted
parts, foreign nationals can search for and access information they can see, such as
schedule, change orders or non-sensitive design and process data, while still adhering to
the letter and spirit of the law dictated in ITAR. This solution took time to
institutionalize, because it represented a change to the normal way of doing work. When
this new process was not followed, it created noticeable information hiding problems
with international participants that helped to reinforce the importance of data separation.
Today, it works most of the time, and some of those interviewed mentioned that the
situation is much better than in the past.
The issue of technology transfer is a thorny issue that must be negotiated between the
armed forces of partner nations, with dramatic consequences for the program. Obviously,
the larger companies in the extended enterprise, such as BAE Systems and Lockheed
Martin, are very actively working with their governments to overcome these barriers to
strategic integration. There are still open issues and must be resolved in the coming years
before the F-35 enters production if the current structure of the JSF program and future
international collaborative efforts like it are to be successful.
ITAR is a strategic barrier that influences all areas of integration, including technical
and organizational integration. Many of the solutions developed for working within the
confines of ITAR are indeed technical and organizational, and these. These issues will
resurface in those sections of this chapter.
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7.3 Supplier-Partners
The Joint Strike Fighter Program envisioned a large change in the traditional role
that suppliers played in past aerospace programs in an effort to drastically reduce costs on
the aircraft. In the past, there has been what some called "a PO mentality" within the
industry: the prime contractor would draft a very specific contract with detailed
requirements and designs, and then the suppliers would manufacture the piece exactly to
specifications. Suppliers could then expect the prime contractors to force them to lower
prices or face losing a contract. Even though price reductions were being routinely forced
on them in an older system, suppliers had little say in the design to effect real cost
savings, had little share of the risk, and could not integrate subsystems of their own or
provide value to the program in other ways. Programs with such traditional supply chains
showed little integration beyond possibly the top tiers into the smaller suppliers, and
could not be seriously considered an "extended enterprise," as the suppliers were not true
members of the enterprise network with real bilateral links, but rather exogenous entities
that had to be "handled" by the prime contractors. As a result, there were often problems
in the supply base that caused delays and technical problems that affected the entire
program, necessitating a change in the prime-supplier relationship.
Today, this relationship is changing, and the JSF Program Office hopes that the
JSF Program will be a model of this change in the military aerospace industry. The
military customer has gone through changes of its own to encourage this behavior,
moving away from hard specifications and requirements in its contracts to performance-
based requirements that contractors can meet in ways they believe are optimal. These
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changes have been codified in the Department of Defense Directive 5000 with
subsequent revisions. Color-of-money issues, where sources of money dictate where it
can be spent, have been reduced, creating more of a "single pot of money" environment
that is much more conducive to flexible allocation of resources to achieve desired
outcomes. The customer would like to move towards a more participatory supplier base
that is active in design and can take on more responsibility, providing increased value to
the program and heading off upstream problems before they make their way farther
downstream and causing very costly rework cycles.
These supplier-partners collaborate on lower-cost and more manufacturable
designs that will benefit everyone in the extended enterprise. These supplier relationships
are more long-term, leading to more trust in the network and allowing greater network
flexibility. For their part, suppliers are eager for many of these changes, as greater
responsibility often means greater financial rewards and brings freedom from the
relentless pressure to reduce prices while having no control over the design or
specifications.
Currently, interviewees described that Lockheed Martin is trying very hard to get
away from the old "PO (Purchase Order) mentality" towards suppliers as replaceable
sources of low-cost fabrication and to treat them more as partners on the program with
added responsibilities, although this has been a hard thing for the company to do. One
person mentioned that he prefers using the term "extended team" rather than "suppliers"
to help foster this mindset. There will always be a "my idea is better than your idea"
attitude when comparing similar ideas between a large prime and a smaller supplier that
is hard to avoid. Everyone involved, however, acknowledges that the real cost savings in
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future aircraft must come from the supplier base, and beating up suppliers for lower
prices has limited utility over the long run, especially if suppliers have little control over
design and subsystem integration. If costs are to be drastically reduced, suppliers and
primes must work together on new designs and processes that allow for more drastic cost
reductions without eliminating the profitability of the suppliers. It is through partnership
with creative incentive structures that costs can be dramatically reduced through a "win-
win" arrangement -not through strong-arm tactics forcing suppliers to reduce price
without little guidance or influence over the design.
Lockheed Martin has taken partnering in its supplier base very seriously, as the
supplier network will account for between 70 and 80 percent of the total value of the
aircraft °. When determining supplier-partners, Lockheed Martin performs a risk
assessment of the partnership with multiple levels of fidelity, projecting the outcome of
possible scenarios on the partnership and the ability of the supplier-partner to deliver on
its promised capabilities. Detailed business plans with long term, multi-year projections
are considered, and partnerships are only approved if it can be determined that the
partnership will be mutually beneficial with a certain likelihood.
Some mentioned that there was concern in the industry after the defense
acquisition reforms that the prime contractors in the industry would take the
performance-based requirements from the customer and simply turn them into detailed
specifications for the suppliers, doing little to allow these reforms to impact the supply
chain. To combat this, Lockheed Martin has made the decision on the JSF to buy at the
10 Barlas, Demir. "Lockheed's Virtual Workspace." Line56. February 20, 2002.
Accessed online at
http://www.line56.com/articles/default.asp?articlelD=3393&TopiclD=2 on August 4,
2005.
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systems-level as much as possible, which means that suppliers will be responsible for
more integration and design. Suppliers are often encouraged to work together on systems.
Lockheed Martin will intentionally pair suppliers with complementary core competencies
together in an effort to get a single best design rather than two competing designs with
different weaknesses. Contracts can be given to groups of suppliers for a system, and
Lockheed Martin lets the suppliers decide how to best split the contract among
themselves, hopefully leading to a more optimal allocation. The idea is that if the team is
rewarded, as opposed to individual suppliers, there will be more incentive for supplier-
partners to help each other. This must be handled carefully, however; just as Lockheed
Martin learned on the F/A-22 Raptor program with Boeing, rivals are not known for their
open and collaborative approaches on programs that they are forced to share. Although
the supply chain design and management practices on the JSF program contain many
features of lean supply chain management, it remains to be seen how deeply the basic
lean principles have been actually adopted by observing the program outcomes in the
future in terms of affordability and other targets.
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7.4 Strategic Lessons Learned
* It is difficult keeping international partners satisfied with a non-traditional
partnering arrangement. Although contracts do not specify returns on investment,
there is a minimum level that is expected. This disconnect must be resolved.
* In order to have a significant impact on program cost, suppliers of systems need
to be involved in the design process to give them the power to significantly affect
designed-in cost.
* It is very valuable to have a single customer voice (the JPO), instead of answering
to many customers as on previous joint programs
* Traditional industry supply chain incentives should be changed to reward
cooperative team behavior
* A challenge ahead is to understand how to reward suppliers for intellectual
contributions
* Both colocation and site visits with critical suppliers are very effective at building
trust, establishing connections, and improving communication between members
of the extended enterprise.
* The structure of information is key to working within ITAR restrictions on export
of technical information and avoiding information hiding and design churn.
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8 Chapter 8: Technical Integration on the JSF Program
The technical integration strategies taken by Lockheed Martin on the Joint Strike
Fighter JSF have caught the attention of industry and others in the information systems
industry for its new uses of technology to integrate such a large and complex extended
enterprise as well as to design and manufacture the technologically advanced F-35 JSF
aircraft. Although the technical integration strategies of the JSF program have received
the most attention from those outside the program, the extended enterprise as a whole
realizes that technical integration strategy alone is but one leg of the overall integration
approach. It sees this as a critical enabler that facilitates collaborative, integrated work,
and which also complements the strategic and organizational integration approaches that
are also being pursued concurrently.
Technical integration consists of design integration, handled by a design process
for the entire extended enterprise, and a technical infrastructure for collaboration. The
design integration process is centrally controlled by the system architecture to minimize
misunderstandings and rework as people from across the extended enterprise seek to
design and build parts of the aircraft with a high degree of interaction. The technical
infrastructure is the hardware and software in place to allow partners from across the
extended enterprise to work on the system collaboratively. It was designed and
implemented by Lockheed Martin Aeronautics' Information Systems & Technology
division, independently of other partners in the extended enterprise. When designing the
system, the goal was to design "an architecture that would promote a team environment,
rather than emphasizing a prime/contractor role."
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Technical integration is important during many phases of the program's lifecycle,
ranging from design, where the emphases are on an integrated design space and
integrated processes, to manufacturing and support, where the emphasis is on having the
right information at the right place at the right time in a clearly digestable format.
Technology was used as a tool to fundamentally redesign the character of the enterprise
network and its methods of operation, in a way quite similar to what is outlined in the
fifth level (network redesign) of Venkatraman's framework for technology-enabled
transformation of business, (addressed in Chapter 3). To date, although there have been
growing pains and many lessons learned, the system is providing value to the extended
enterprise. This section will outline the challenges faced when implementing and
operating the processes and systems put in place for technical integration of the extended
enterprise, and identify enablers and lessons learned from the experience.
8.1 Technical Design Integration
The ultimate authority for all technical design integration issues lies with the
Office of the Chief Engineer of the JSF, which ultimately controls the Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) of the aircraft. The WBS is a set of design documents describing
specific system boundaries for the aircraft that are owned by an organization within the
extended enterprise. Whoever owns the WBS for a section of the aircraft has authority
over integration within that area, as well as at the interfaces of its internal system. WBS
is described in greater detail in Section 9.1.
The Chief Engineer's "watchdog" for system integration issues on software and
missions systems (avionics), one of the most complex systems on the aircraft, is the
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system architect. The system architect creates and maintains the system architecture and
interfaces for these systems, watches over all technical integration issues, and enforces
design policy. The system architecture of the avionics is a very critical component of the
aircraft, as it determines everything from its ultimate performance to the designability,
testability, and feasibility of the system.
In addition to the creation and maintenance of the system architecture, the system
architect is responsible for signing off on all Requirements Work Packages (RWPs) that
are produced by the system engineers on the design integration teams in avionics. RWPs
set performance goals, specify interfaces, perform error analysis for specific subsystems.
Additionally, both the US Air Force and the Navy have sent in teams to examine the
integration work on the JSF and make recommendations to the system architect.
A further look into the task of the system architect and the integration of avionics
on the JSF will yield a very good example of technical design integration challenges in
the JSF program and will be explored in greater depth.
8.1.1.1 Avionics Integration Challenges
Avionics architectures have been steadily evolving in the past three decades, and
have swung between loosely coupled federated systems to highly integrated systems and
back over this time period. The most recently designed fighter, the F/A-22, has the most
integrated avionics architecture of any aircraft developed, and it ran into many, many
problems during development, stemming from its technical feasibility and from
mismatches between its technical architecture and the organizational architecture of the
team that designed it. One particular problem of note was that the mission system
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software was highly unstable after it was initially developed and released. Due to the
highly integrated nature of the system and the demands it made on its hardware, it was
extremely difficult to debug, and required a great deal of attention from many high -
profile experts to finally get it to an acceptably workable state. These problems caused
very significant delays in the delivery of the F/A-22, and greatly contributed to higher
development costs.
When developing the avionics architecture for the JSF, the system architect chose
a more "hybrid" approach for the system architecture than the F/A-22 used, incorporating
more federated, modular systems together with some specific integrated systems to
specifically avoid the problems that plagued the F/A-22. The reasoning for this was that
it made business sense: this hybrid architecture would be easier to debug, manage, and
control. It allowed the use of more inexpensive processors and makes fewer demands on
the computational infrastructure as a whole. The decision on whether to go with a
federated or integrated system was made on a case-by-case basis, analyzing the function
and critical interfaces of the component before making a decision. Central processing, for
example, remained integrated, because it was easier to upgrade this capability with a
single source, as opposed to many distributed processors. Over time, the feeling held by
several of those interviewed has been that the trend in avionics architectures will swing
back towards integrated architectures as processing power, communication speeds, and
tools to work with highly integrated systems become more mature.
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8.2 Physical Network
One of the least problematic aspects of integration has been development of the
physical communications network. Lockheed Martin laid dedicated communication lines
to over 150 supplier-partners to include them in a dedicated, high-speed, secure, wide-
area network infrastructure, at a rate of 50 lines per year, using a highly flexible, agile
deployment team. The entire network uses commercially available components, albeit in
conformance with DoD requirements for secure communication at the physical layer.
There are parallel, firewalled computer networks where required by DoD security
restrictions. There are multiple physical computer and communication networks,
including one internal to Lockheed Martin employees, one for American work on the JSF
external to Lockheed Martin (the primary network for the extended enterprise) and a
third, separate network for foreign nationals working on the program. Although
maintaining separate networks is an added burden, it is a security requirement from the
customer intended to keep sensitive data in "safe" areas.
Lockheed Martin Information Systems & Technology is constantly upgrading
hardware, monitoring performance, and reviewing the system at approximately six-month
intervals. These reviews are driven by the condition of the network rather than by a set
schedule. The entire infrastructure is on a three-year upgrade cycle, and each part is
monitored and replaced before it fails. In the opinion of those in Information Systems &
Technology, this is the easy part-they have done it for years, and the hardware in use is
fairly well understood. Problems do occasionally appear, but are usually quickly
resolved by experienced teams.
Above the physical network on the transmission layer, the wide-area network uses
standard TCP/IP for communication, with added encryption technologies specified by the
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DoD where necessary. The expertise necessary for such systems already was resident at
Lockheed Martin, and it was able to install this very large network in fairly short order,
considering the size, security considerations and the number of sites included in the
network.
The true technical challenge for integrating the extended enterprise is not the
physical layer-it is the application layer, the myriad tools that must work together to
design, manage, and build a very complex aircraft with many radically different systems.
The next section will move into exploring the challenges to integrating this aspect of the
networked infrastructure.
8.3 Logical Network
The "logical network" refers to the parts of the network that provide logical
connectivity-ensuring that one part of the network can logically interoperate with each
other part. This includes standardization or interoperation of file formats, databases, and
tools necessary for the design, management, fabrication, and maintenance of the JSF. It is
the integration of the logical network where the real challenges lie in the technical
integration of a complex extended enterprise such as the JSF. Typically, each member of
the extended enterprise has traditionally used its own tools, processes and policies to
design its own components in a way it has been comfortable with on past aircraft
programs, thus making collaborative work with others who have different tools,
processes and policies extremely difficult on new programs. Logically integrating tools
and processes requires changes in the technology, specific applications and procedures
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used, which are usually met with stiff cultural resistance from people who must work
with these changes.
An effective strategy for successful technical integration of enterprise networks
should understand that integration in and of itself is not the ultimate goal. The ultimate
goal should be overall network performance. The central task should be to understand
how to integrate resources across the extended enterprise just enough to allow people
effectively get their job done-eliminating waste and redundancy throughout the
enterprise's computer and information network-without creating a new process that is
so integrated that it diminishes the effectiveness of the previously diverse and specialized
tools and processes. Ultimately, a decision must be made to determine which systems
should be standardized and tightly integrated, and which systems should be left de-
coupled or federated.
As more tools and processes are integrated, the program becomes easier to
manage and will run smoother, but a uniform environment that promotes a "one size fits
all" approach will hamper the creativity and capabilities of individual systems, according
to one of those interviewed. The JSF program initially attempted to integrate
information, design, and manufacturing systems as much as possible, as it saw technical
integration as one of the cornerstones of the program. Over time, it identified portions
that could deal with less integration, and has either decreased its integration efforts in
these areas or has decided to build systems differently on future programs. The challenge
in integrating such a complex environment is to understand the tradeoffs that occur when
integrating and knowing where the marginal benefits from integration lie.
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There are three large information systems that serve as logical, connectivity across
the air vehicle portion of the JSF extended enterprise. The first, and most difficult to
implement, is the Virtual Processing Center (VPC), the massive collection of integrated
tools centered on a Product Data Management (PDM) system that also features security
and document control. In addition to the VPC, the JSF Data Library (JDL) serves as an
integrated repository of all business and process data for the aircraft, and the Integrated
Management Framework (IMF) serves as the integrated management portal used by
program management, supplier-partners, and the JPO. The following sections will outline
each of these logical integration systems, and the challenges encountered in design,
implementation, and operation of them.
8.4 The Virtual Processing Center
The Virtual Processing Center is a massive suite of design tools centered on a PDM
system that allows engineers from across the extended enterprise to collaboratively
design the JSF, even from remote locations. Lockheed Martin developed the Virtual
Processing Center working with existing commercial design tools and their vendors to
incorporate these tools into a central suite of tools. It wanted to avoid custom-made, in-
house solutions wherever possible to save the expense of independent development and
to benefit from the expertise of companies who operate in niche markets. These tools
were modified from their original form to work seamlessly with other tools as part of an
integrated system that could be used to easily share, store, and control design data from a
single source. Ideally, the system should help people understand how the design decisions
they make interact with the decisions of others around them, and help identify conflicts
140
early in the design and manufacturing process. Lockheed Martin went to its engineers, as
well as those of its primary partners, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems, to identify
the tools that they desired to use and identified more than 400 tools to be integrated into
the VPC. Mapping them together, ensuring interoperability and then validating such a
large array of tools into a single platform that users could log into from a single source
proved to be a tremendous challenge for Lockheed Martin's Information Systems &
Technology division.
The goal of the VPC was to create a highly integrated design environment that
would enforce common processes with standard tools that everyone across the enterprise
could use, while controlling access to sensitive documents and maintaining version
control of documents. In reality, this proved very difficult, as there were a number of
challenges that developers faced along the way: users' choice of tools or design platform
often conflicted; they disliked standardized processes; the VPC (and especially the PDM
component) did not allow people to work in the way they were accustomed to; it was
difficult to get input from users when the system was being designed; and there was
resistance to the system once it was initially implemented.
8.4.1 VPC Development
Work on the VPC began during the Concept Development Phase, when the
prototype X-35 and Boeing's X-32 were in competition for the JSF contract. This was a
very busy, turbulent time during the program's history, and the X-35 development team
had many difficulties gathering the information that it needed. One of the first challenges
came when the team tried to map out engineering design processes, which would become
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embedded into the VPC's architecture. This task required experienced engineers to stop
work momentarily and think very critically about how they do their job, asking questions
such as "what information do I produce," "how do I produce information," and "where
does the information go when I am through with it?" These data would allow VPC
designers to tailor the VPC to make doing a job easier by codifying the work required for
it into standard processes. Getting engineers on the program during this crucial time to
slow down long enough to describe their work in the detail that IS&T desired was very
difficult, and the engineers often tried to push the task back onto the VPC design team.
As a result, IS&T often had to make best guesses as to process using the data at hand. As
one person noted, "although it takes a while, it's relatively easy to develop the tools, but
it's much harder to understand the process."
Tool selection for the VPC did not always go smoothly. Lockheed Martin
involved its close partners in the tool selection, but ultimately, it made the final decision.
One notable point of contention centered on one of the largest tools in the VPC-CATIA,
an integrated suite of Computer Aided Design (CAD), Computer Aided Engineering
(CAE), and Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM) applications. Although most
companies throughout the industry use CATIA, there are divisions that exist based on the
version of the software in use. Lockheed Martin desired to standardize on Version 4.6 on
Unix platforms for the JSF program. Northrop Grumman had previously standardized its
entire company on Version 5 using Windows NT, which was not backwards compatible
with the older version. Each company had legitimate reasons for standing by its version
(primarily based on leveraging resources in other programs the companies had) and
adamantly refused to migrate to the other system. In the end, this problem was not
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resolved, and each company continued to use its own version, causing large inefficiencies
in the system due to undetected version conflicts. A middleware solution was developed
to help translate between the two file formats, but this process was not always
successful.
The software architecture for the VPC was centered on a PDM system from
Metaphase with a large number of integrated design and manufacturing tools (such as
CATIA) feeding design data into the PDM for storage, analysis and collaboration. An
interviewee said that this architecture "evolved" as the need for it became apparent. The
lead system architect for the VPC relied loosely on the Zachmann Framework and
another reference architecture from the Metagroup when designing the VPC architecture,
but the concept was largely developed in-house and would be a new experiment in PDM
implementation.
As the center of the VPC, the PDM was the first area of the VPC to receive
attention from the VPC team and continued to be a key area of development throughout
the VPC's implementation. After successfully identifying the tools to be used on the
VPC, the next task was mapping the exchange of information between all of these tools,
identifying interfaces, and developing middleware that would allow the translation of
data into mutually comprehensible formats. This process was tedious, but fairly straight
forward in the opinion of those interviewed.
8.4.1.1 Security in the VPC
Security was a critical element of the Virtual Processing Center. The VPC was
tasked with controlling access to the design data for a very advanced fighter with many
highly sensitive capabilities, such as stealth and advanced avionics. Many of these
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technologies are highly restricted by ITAR. Therefore, the VPC had to ensure security
across both corporate and international boundaries.
A key question while securing the VPC was whether to harden the applications
and tools, the network, or some combination of the two. There are DoD standards for
securing classified computer networks that provide security for all levels of digital
communication from the physical layer up to the application layer. While some aspects
of the JSF are classified and must be handled under these government guidelines for
security, many aspects of the program are not. New guidelines had to be drafted for
technical security in these industry-sensitive areas that met the security needs of the
program and all of its participants while remaining flexible enough not to impede work
across company boundaries.
One person said that in future projects such as the VPC, much more attention will
be paid to the area of security earlier in the design process to understand how to best use
applications with firewalls. The observation was that security on a large program in an
extended enterprise is different from security on smaller, self-contained programs, and
that few people today, including security experts, have a good understanding of how to
secure computing infrastructures across extended enterprises. In these programs, security
has become intertwined with all aspects of the program, and cannot be added to the
network as an afterthought after the system's architecture has already been established.
8.4.1.2 The Product Data Management System
The PDM is the center of the VPC because it acts as the universal gatekeeper of
all design data for the JSF. All designs are stored on a central server in Ft. Worth, with
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linked servers in El Segundo, California and Salmesbury, UK. The PDM system controls
access to this database by requiring permissions granted to the user, tracks versions of
changes to all files created in any of the many tools integrated into the VPC, controls the
flow of data between users, and allows users to remotely collaborate in real time on
designs. Additionally, it tracks common and non-common components across the three
versions of the aircraft. The system allows data to be easily classifiable and searchable,
making it much easier to track changes across the system and identify potential problems
before they emerge, in theory. These capabilities require that data is appropriately marked
and labeled using metadata when it is created and submitted to the system.
The VPC team worked closely with the Lockheed Martin office devoted to ITAR
compliance to ensure that the system accurately controlled access to all documents and
designs as required by ITAR. PDM systems enforce a more disciplined design processes,
as users must frequently commit their designs to the system so that others can see them
and potentially collaborate.
8.4.1.3 Pilot Programs on the PDM
The VPC team developed a pilot program for the PDM system that worked with
structural engineers in order to address potential problems with the system long before it
was deployed. The pilot program went very well in the eyes of its designers, and all
involved felt that they had successfully vetted the system. However, many problems
emerged with the PDM when users from other design disciplines especially those users
who dealt with non-structural aspects of design-began to use the system. It had not been
developed with the needs of these more abstract disciplines in mind, and was biased
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towards systems that could be easily visualized. In the case of software or electronics, for
example, although documents could be committed to the system and tracked, its users use
the PDM in a different way than a structures user would.
The pilot program had been overly narrow in scope, focused on a "best case"
discipline. While this may be effective in situations where the system needed to be
"sold," in this case the opposite problem occurred: the difficulties encountered by some
disciplines led to limited buy-in, and resistance to a system that many people saw as
forcing them to work in a way they did not like, although many of these people had been
asked for input on their work processes earlier.
8.4.1.4 Post-Implementation and Non-technical Obstacles to Technical Integration
At the time that Lockheed Martin won the Concept Design Phase competition,
allowing it to move forward with the detailed design of the F-35, the VPC was not
finished, and was missing a few tools. This was not a major concern, initially. Lockheed
Martin had expected to have several months after the announcement of the contract
award to prepare for the program and the sudden loading of the system before the
contract was awarded, as was the case in all previous military aerospace acquisition
programs on which Lockheed Martin had worked. Instead, no such time became available
immediately after the contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin and the entire program
scrambled to get up to speed. As a result, the VPC went into operation before it was as
fully developed as planned, which inevitably led to criticism of the system and resistance
from its users. The system could not handle the shock of so many new users and
encountered growing pains. This led to many data and process ownership challenges that
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are detailed in Section 9.3, including the creation of localized parallel systems to
circumvent the PDM's data storage capabilities and process management capabilities.
8.4.1.5 Reflections on the PDM and the VPC
In retrospect, the system designers felt that there were many lessons learned to
make such systems easier to implement in the future. Technically, future projects will
employ a federated architecture, and will not be centered on a single application as
heavily as the VPC was dependent on the PDM. There are two primary reasons for this:
first, the designers interviewed have expressed the feeling that a federated system without
a single overwhelming application is more scaleable and not as prone to crashing under
heavy loading, and second, security experts are more comfortable securing federated
systems. Perhaps with future advancements in PDM technology and increased security
experience with centralized systems this may change, but this is the current feeling at the
program.
The VPC designers feel that there was a lot of planning that went into the design
of the system, but that it was at the wrong level. Instead of focusing as heavily on tool
selection and verification, which turned out to be fairly straightforward, more effort
should have been directed towards understanding the processes that would be captured by
the system, understanding and incorporating the role of security earlier in the design of
the technical system, and spending much more time getting stakeholder (particularly
engineering) buy-in on the project, thus easing adoption. The immediate project ramp-up
after contract award was completely unanticipated. Nevertheless, the system should have
been much more thoroughly tested before being made ready for use. After the initial
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release, it was impossible to keep people from breaking away from standard processes
and using other systems, because the PDM had many open technical issues at the time.
Additionally, the pilot programs developed for any new system must be piloted in
all of the various environments it will operate in, rather than only the most likely to
succeed or understand. None of the pilot programs that the VPC design team used were
broad enough to encounter all of the problems that were eventually encountered. Had
these problems been identified earlier, much of the early resistance to the system could
have been defeated faster.
8.4.2 JSF Data Library
The VPC is the largest of the three primary technical information systems
deployed across the JSF extended enterprise. The other two are the JSF Data Library
(JDL) and the Internal Management Framework (IMF). While the PDM system in the
VPC contains all of the design data for the aircraft in a build-to-print format, the JDL is a
database that contains all of the process and business data required to build the aircraft
from the data in the PDM. As an analogy, if the PDM contained the blueprints for the
aircraft, the JDL would contain the instructions to build it, as well as the history of how
the design would actually have evolved and how common mistakes could be avoided.
Unlike previous programs that had such data scattered across the enterprise, the JDL is a
single, unified repository for all programmatic data across the extended enterprise. It has
proven to be an exceptional tool for the program, and has enabled knowledge transfer
throughout the extended enterprise. Lockheed Martin took the same idea and transferred
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it to the older F/A-22 Raptor program after seeing how well the JDL worked for the JSF
program, where it has also has met with success.
The JDL was described as an unfolding bulletin board, with ideas and lessons
learned posted in pertinent areas for others who follow to see. This was found to be more
useful than other knowledge management systems that are in effect searchable databases,
because rather than having to search for a lesson learned or for design decision history,
the information a user would need would be right there on the computer screen as the
user would look at each pertinent section of the aircraft in the JDL. Many of those
interviewed said that while the JDL is a useful system now, its real value lies in the years
ahead, as changes and upgrades are made to the aircraft by future engineers who will
refer back to the original development notes to see what had been tried and what was
problematic. All of those interviewed universally had a favorable opinion of the JDL.
8.4.3 The Internal Management Framework
The last major technical information system is the Integrated Management System
(IMF). The IMF can be seen as a program manager's portal into the program, allowing
management to look at live updates on cost, schedule, risk management, and other
program management metrics. Access to this "dashboard" system is not limited to
program management only, however. Access is open to members across the extended
enterprise from customers to suppliers, allowing small- and medium-sized partners or the
JPO to have the same integrated view of the extended enterprise as program managers at
Lockheed Martin have. The idea is to give everyone across the JSF insight into the larger
picture of how the extended enterprise is doing, allowing all the participants to orient
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themselves on how best they can benefit the extended enterprise. The intention was that
the IMF would be a heavily used system to access continually updated metrics.
After implementation, however, the widespread usage did not materialize, even
though the IMF worked as promised to give insight into the performance of the JSF
program. Today, several hundred people regularly access IMF on a weekly basis to track
the program. It has been discovered that people from different parts of the extended
enterprise use it in different ways-a 4th tier supplier uses it primarily for scheduling,
while the JPO closely tracks many aspects in addition to schedule, such as cost or risk. In
light of this, in the future there may be more customization of the IMF for groups of
stakeholders to allow them to make better use of the system. Although the massive use
envisioned for the IMF did not materialize, the system is still considered a success and
continues to receive updates and improvements to make it more useful.
8.4.4 Semantics and Data Exchange
A final major concern encountered in the technical integration of the JSF was the
issue of semantics and the related topic of data exchange. When many companies come
together within a large industry to collaborate on a project, or even with divisions within
a single large company come together, semantics are frequently an issue, as engineers
from different companies work together with similar but slightly differing vocabularies
and methods for communicating data. For the most part, many traditional semantic
issues due to miscommunication have been resolved by using the VPC as a common set
of tools and processes for design. By forcing everyone to use the same system, semantic
misunderstandings have been reduced. Differences still arise, especially with
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international partners who are not used to American industry. Due to the unified nature of
the system, however, semantic misunderstandings are usually quickly caught and become
annoyances rather than disasters. Very few of those interviewed who worked with
Lockheed Martin using the VPC and JDL mentioned that semantic issues remained a
major problem in their own work.
There was one example of a semantic problem on the program that an interviewee
mentioned that occurred on the development of the F-119 engine by Pratt & Whitney.
Pratt & Whitney, as prime contractor for the F-119 engine, uses its own systems for
design and collaboration on the propulsion system, and is not a part of the Lockheed
Martin-led air vehicle network that uses the VPC. While working on the F-119 with one
of its partners, Pratt & Whitney encountered a significant delay with an engine
component. After many integration meetings between management and lead engineers, it
was discovered that the two companies had slightly different definitions for a particular
measure of engine performance, leading to a technical discrepancy that was the source of
the delay. This delay cost several thousand dollars as a result of a slight undetected
disagreement on the meaning of a specific term. Such a semantic problem as this may not
be always prevented by a unified system such as the VPC and JDL, but the increased
visibility such a system, if the two companies in fact used it, might have allowed them to
identify the semantic mismatch much earlier.
One other area that has received attention is the issue of data exchange. Although
the VPC uses standard formats for relaying data between any of its many applications and
the PDM system, the designers of the VPC and the JDL want to ensure that the technical
data are easily readable even when removed from the current environment, as in the case
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of a system upgrade. On previous projects, there have been issues with highly proprietary
EDI data formats and their ability to handle system upgrades and modifications, leading
to many headaches during system upgrades. The current trend has gone towards adopting
open XML-based industry standards for all data exchange between applications in the
VPC as well as the JDL. The open format ensures that the data will be easily transferable
and readable by all who follow the standard, making system upgrades much less painful.
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8.5 Technical Lessons Learned
* Highly integrated technical designs are very difficult to debug, manage, and
control as the complexity rises. Hybrid systems are more manageable at the
present time, given the structure of most development organizations
* The physical network for integrating an extended enterprise is the easier part; the
software, protocols and standards it requires are much harder and should receive
more attention in the network creation phase
* Invest as much time as possible in understanding the actual processes that workers
use. This is more important than many technical concerns, because if done
poorly, it will lead to an ineffective system that will be resisted by those who must
use it
* A centralized repository of design data integrated with design tools can overcome
many common technical and organizational integration challenges, integrating
processes, semantic differences and tools, but the technology will present its own
challenges
* From the point of view of security and scalability, a federated structure with a
centralized repository is superior to a highly integrated structure for enterprise-
wide systems for design like the VPC
* Only make processes common that absolutely must be to allow for flexibility. It is
unrealistic to make everyone on all programs use exactly the same processes.
* Design tools must be identical and speak a common language
* Pilot programs for systems that will be applied across many disciplines should
have pilots in all of those programs to avoid surprises later after implementation.
* A unified data library of all process and business data such as the JDL is highly
valuable resource for an extended enterprise
* The extended enterprise should use open, flexible standards for data transfer to
ensure that systems will be easily upgradeable
* Technical collaboration is most important in the design phase-it is less important
later
* Systems may not always be used as they were originally intended; the designers
should be flexible and allow the system to morph in the direction its users desire
as long as this is beneficial to the program
* Avoid implementing a large, process-altering system before it is proven and
mature
* Middleware should be used to were possible to reuse robust legacy systems that
have been proven and validated on other programs
* Beware of information overload from technical sources. There is a limit to how
much information can be "pushed" to users. Technical information systems
cannot entirely replace "face time"
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9 Chapter 9: Organizational Integration on the JSF
Program
Organizational Integration is the last of the three aspects of enterprise integration
addressed in the framework proposed in Chapter 4 to look at the JSF Program. The JSF
extended enterprise learned fairly early in the life of the program that it must address
several organizational challenges before its strategic and technical strategies for
enterprise integration could have their intended impact. The integration strategy for the
JSF program was largely driven earlier by strategy and technology, missing the
organizational dimension. In some cases, these organizational barriers to integration
were initially overlooked or neglected in the face of more pressing technical and strategic
concerns, only later to be addressed once their influence was felt, as this chapter will
show. By pursuing strategies for integrating organizations' cultures and structures
concurrently with technical and strategic integration strategies, system deployment and
operation will proceed much more smoothly.
There have been several challenges in organizational integration that the JSF
program has faced to date. One of the earliest challenges faced was how to integrate
many different cultures owing allegiance to many sources into a single, coherent program
with a clear direction, which requires more than just technical connectivity. It also must
also address issues that arise in organizational rivalries, especially in light of data
ownership and management. Finally, from the point of view of architecture, the JSF
program must ensure that its organizational structures are properly aligned with the
technical system architectures that they are involved with to ensure a proper fit, and that
there are organizational structures in place to ensure technical and strategic integration is
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accomplished. Not surprisingly, many of these organizational barriers to integration are
closely linked with the implementation of the VPC, discussed in Section 8.4.
9.1 Control Structures
As mentioned in Chapter 4, one of the unique aspects of integration of enterprise
networks is the need for adequate control structures and centralized authority. Perhaps
this is a problem in comparatively smaller, dynamic virtual enterprises where there is no
single dominant partner. However, similar, questions of authority-and especially
funding-would be expected to appear in extended enterprises as well.
Lockheed Martin, as the prime contractor, has ultimate authority over the air
vehicle (although the JPO can issue requirements and make its wishes known). While
prime contractors have always had authority over their supplier networks, the difference
on the JSF program is that there is a large amount of collaborative work and there are
much greater resources devoted to the network for integration and coordination. This
empowers the supplier network and involves them in the program more directly and at a
higher level. To maintain the spirit of teamwork and a real sense of partnership, as well as
to receive valuable input from its partners, Lockheed Martin consults with its partners
across the extended enterprise before making decisions that would impact the extended
enterprise, although, as one person who was interviewed mentioned, it also occasionally
unintentionally "slips" and makes an internal decision that impacts others without
consultation Although there is a process set up for consultation and advising, such as the
Strategic Suppliers Advisory Council mentioned below, Lockheed Martin ultimately
makes the final call, allowing for a fairly quick, decisive process.
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The primary reason that Lockheed Martin makes the final call is that it is the
owner of the prime contract, and as a result, it controls the budget. Capital investments
for network-wide tools and integration are paid for by Lockheed Martin's internal funds,
not by the program. Before the JSF contract award, much of the original design of the
VPC was paid for through Lockheed Martin's corporate funding for internal research and
development. Because it is the prime contractor and it has made this investment, and
continues to be the main funding source for the entire system, Lockheed Martin has the
final word on decisions in the network.
Another important source of authority on the JSF is the breakdown of technical
work on the program. The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) clearly specifies who has
authority over which aspects of the aircraft. The owner of the WBS for each section of
the aircraft is, in effect, "the prime contractor for that section," and controls most aspects
of that section, including management of supplier-partners and manufacturing. Northrop
Grumman holds the WBS for the mid-fuselage, BAE Systems holds the WBS for the aft-
fuselage and tail surfaces, and Lockheed Martin holds one for the forward fuselage and
another for the integration of the entire aircraft. Defining the boundaries of the WBS
between major subsystems is a major challenge for the chief engineer and his staff, as this
will specify the inter-company interfaces on the project as well as the technical interfaces.
It is a critical boundary between technical and organizational designs, and ultimately has
a significant impact on the difficulty and success of integration on the aircraft. A large
amount of time was spent defining the WBS before the contract award, and there
continues to be a great amount of time devoted to engineering integration and systems
engineering. Design Integration Teams, groups of system engineers who focus on the
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technical integration challenges, tackle many of the engineering integration issues. Their
organizational structure is designed to closely correspond to the actual structure of the
WBS to promote a better match between technical and organizational architectures. They
make sure that there are no mismatches between the division of work defined by the
WBS itself and organizational structure, within Lockheed Martin as well as across the
supplier network, responsible for performing the work on the aircraft.
9.2 Integrating Organizations and Cultures across the JSF
Extended Enterprise
One of the earliest challenges to organizational integration that the JSF program
faced was learning how to integrate the many members of the JSF extended enterprise in
such a way to engender a "team spirit" and foster increased communication and
collaboration across the network, while ensuring clear, established lines of authority and
control for the network where necessary and desirable. This includes supplier-partner
collocation, site visits, and specific organizational structures designed to ensure
collaboration and integration. The JSF extended enterprise is trying to break out of
traditional supplier-contractor relationships and move towards a more collaborative
approach.
To foster a sense of camaraderie on the program, both the JPO and Lockheed
Martin have spent a significant amount of resources on both public and internal relations
to promote the idea of a single JSF Program Team. The international diversity of the
program is often celebrated on insignia, logos, press conferences, and newsletters. There
is an extended enterprise-wide newsletter published by Lockheed Martin, which fosters
this team spirit by featuring the partner nations and smaller suppliers across the network
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to give those working on the program in many companies a sense of membership in the
program in addition to helping to elevate their visibility within their own companies. For
many in the network, working in this way as part of a larger team has taken some
adjustment. BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman both have traditionally been prime
contractors in their own right, and they are used to having ultimate authority in their
respective spheres. According to one person interviewed, this was the source of some
initial frustration. Also, for many other suppliers, especially non-North American
suppliers, there seems to be a great deal of shock associated with working in a foreign
environment, causing frustrations. To address such frustrations, an integrated decision
making process has been put in place, where decisions are discussed with many
stakeholders to ensure that their views are heard and taken into account. Ultimately,
however, Lockheed Martin has the final word, allowing for decisions to be made quickly.
The speed of decision making is especially quick judged by European standards, as one
person interviewed from a European supplier noted.
A critical component to the organizational integration strategy of the JSF
extended enterprise has been collocation of supplier-partners and exchanges of engineers.
This is critical, because despite many advances made in information technology enabling
close collaboration during the design process, the person-to-person interface is still
critical to building trust and teamwork, as well as for design work requiring a high degree
of personal interactions among the design team members.
As the head of the extended enterprise, Lockheed Martin realizes this, and sends
its own engineers to work with its supplier-partners at its facilities on interface and design
issues, as well as temporarily collocating many engineers from supplier-partners in Ft.
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Worth to get them up to speed and become familiar with the program. According to one
person interviewed representing one of the supplier organizations, suppliers and partners
usually send their best people to Ft. Worth in an effort to make a good impression and
lay down the roots of a strong partnership that will last for many years over the life of the
program. They are directing much effort and many assets into building this kind of trust,
including investment in specialized tooling and facilities, in the expectation that their
relationships with Lockheed Martin will prove to be long-lasting.
Collocation is a critical part of both organizational and strategic integration
strategies on the JSF program, because there is a limit to technology-enabled distance
collaborative work, especially in the early design stages, which really does require face-
to-face contact. Collocation of foreign nationals, in particular, presents many work
integration challenges in order to meet ITAR regulations. Many people interviewed,
however, felt that having such people on site is critical for collaboration and
communication and worth the added legal hurdles of ITAR.
Interviewees have also stated that there is an "information overload" throughout
the program, and that "technology should not be used as a crutch for integration." "Face
time is still important" was a common theme heard across the various interviews.
Although one interviewee who worked with supplier-partners thought that having a
"village" of supplier-partners close by would be highly advantageous, there have not
been any partners to date that have built dedicated facilities near the Lockheed Martin
plant in Ft. Worth. Given the history of the troubled F/A-22 program which saw its total
acquisition numbers shrink by more than 200 percent, perhaps suppliers that have so far
chosen not to make such program-specific investments on the JSF may be waiting to see
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if Congress' attitude towards the aircraft will change before the end of the decade, when
production is scheduled to begin in earnest.
Examples of organizational structures supporting supplier involvement in the
design stages include the Joint Product Assessment Team (JPATs), Supplier Integrated
Product Development (SIPD), and the Strategic Supplier Advisory Council. (SSAC).
JPATs are gatherings of suppliers to discuss ideas for systems on the program, which
those at Lockheed Martin cite as promoting versatility among the supplier-partners.
SIPDs are concurrent engineering sessions were many potential suppliers collaboratively
work on designs, together developing potential designs. Lockheed Martin then selects the
best design and a supplier to produce it, while rewarding other suppliers for their
contributions. Rewarding suppliers for their intellectual contributions is not easy, and is
still a point of contention with some, especially for those who have advanced design
capabilities but do not have low-cost production facilities. In such a situation, such a firm
would contribute greatly to the final design, but the ultimate contract may be awarded to
a low-cost firm without such design capabilities. If this becomes a standard method of
design and sourcing among suppliers in the industry, it may lead to a bifurcation of the
supply base into independent design firms and the more traditional "build-only" firms,
which would not significantly change the original supplier-contractor relationships
perhaps apart from adding-in design "consultants."
The Strategic Supplier Advisory Council (SSAC) is a collection of the top 80%
percent (by cost) of suppliers, and meets to consider strategic planning of the extended
enterprise. Lockheed Martin will often draft policies for the extended enterprise and
present them to the SSAC for comments and feedback, which are usually taken and
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incorporated into final policies established for the extended enterprise. This builds trust
across the enterprise by involving suppliers in the decision-making process, and gives
Lockheed Martin much wider array of ideas to consider when making decisions that
affect the extended enterprise.
9.3 Managing Data/Process Ownership Barriers
Some of the more common barriers to organizational integration, especially
involving technical systems, are data and process ownership barriers. The JSF faced
several barriers related to data and process ownership, primarily stemming from the
introduction of the VPC and its PDM system. The new system introduced single-point
data storage, open access, and standardized processes across the extended enterprise.
Although this was highly desirable from a top-level perspective, it upset the balance of
power with respect to data and process ownership across the extended enterprise.
Many groups across the extended enterprise did not embrace the PDM component
of the VPC when it was initially deployed. Rather, they saw it as a challenge to the way
they traditionally worked, their established power structures, and their creativity. In the
words of one person, "very little was done to ease the cultural shock of a new system."
When the VPC system was first introduced, it contained several weaknesses because it
had not yet been thoroughly tested and evaluated due to the compressed schedule after
the contract award, and its detractors were quick to point those weaknesses out.
The ideal of one large database for all program data proved unrealistic in the face
of the PDM's shortcomings after contract award. During this time, many groups across
the extended enterprise set up their own proprietary databases in addition to the PDM to
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handle design using processes they were accustomed to and had control over, and only
committed the final design files to the PDM system after the designs were approaching
completion, defeating the purpose and utility of the PDM's concurrent versioning
capabilities for collaborative development. This maintained the status quo in regards to
processes and data.
Although there was expected resistance from engineers who had spent many years
working at Lockheed Martin and were committed to the processes they were accustomed
to, there was also resistance from newer hires. This was primarily because many of the
older engineers served as supervisors and actively sought to persuade younger engineers
to use the older processes within their group rather than using the unproven PDM.
People were not comfortable with the new, rigorous methods prescribed by the PDM
system and actively circumvented them, allowing for irregular, heterogeneous processes
to continue. This dynamic did not persist, however. Eventually, the large volume of new
hires went through Lockheed Martin's "onboarding" training in the company and the
new system had an impact on the acceptance of the PDM software, as newer hires
became more comfortable with the PDM than with the older processes. This, in
combination with improvements in the system, allowed the PDM to prove itself in the
eyes of most of the engineering design team.
In the three and a half years since the program award, the PDM has matured and it
has been accepted and used by almost everyone across the extended enterprise. The
attitude of those in the "trenches" has progressed from "Stop! It's killing us!" to "We get
it, it works," as one interviewee noted. The parallel systems that many groups developed
alongside the PDM have gradually disappeared as users grew to appreciate what the
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PDM could offer. It took time to mature the application and to make changes to the
system that users requested after the system was initially deployed, as well as for people
to realize that the PDM system did have its benefits and was not going to disappear or
loose support from management. In some cases, management simply had to issue an
edict and migrate the older systems over to the new one. The journey was rocky, but the
system is running today close to how it was originally envisioned, linking engineers from
across the extended enterprise, and will soon involve a wider reach into the supplier base
as manufacturing begins. The system has already performed well during one of the
program's early challenges, the much-publicized effort to reduce the weight of the
STOVL version of the JSF.
9.4 Organizational Structures for Integration
Several people interviewed mentioned the desire to closely match the design of
the organizational structures within the extended enterprise with the actual technical
architecture of the system(s) that organization would work with, in accordance with
"Conway's Law." Conway's Law, which is not law in the strict sense, states
"organizations which design systems are constrained to produce systems which are
copies of the communication structures of these organizations(Conway, 1968)." Although
it has proven difficult in the literature to find convincing evidence that linking
organizational architecture with technical architecture will yield increased efficiency, it
has been considered a good heuristic by the many in the enterprise architecting and
software fields, and followed wherever possible. The impacts of this heuristic, while
anecdotal, have been positive to date.
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One of the examples of this is in the architecture of the avionics system on the F-
35. There were many lessons learned for the JSF program from the problems
encountered on the F/A-22's avionics platform, as described in Section 8.1.1.1. The
challenges on the F/A-22 led some in Lockheed Martin to pay closer attention to the issue
of technical and organizational matching. Those looking back on the F/A-22 program
described the mismatch between the architecture of the organization that designed the
avionics system and the avionics system architecture itself. The avionics system was
very highly integrated with dense communication channels, while the organization was
not nearly as integrated and had more hierarchical communications pathways. Some
suggested that this mismatch, together with critical hardware limitations, could have led
to many of the technical challenges, as the dense information pathways called for in the
technical design were not present in the organizational architecture. The JSF program
embraced this lesson, and moved away from such an integrated technical architecture in
favor of a more federated approach, as it would not be easy to integrate the organization
to the degree necessary for what would have become a highly integrated technical
system. For a system as technically integrated as the F/A-22's avionics, the design
organization would ideally be a single, omnipotent person. The current JSF avionics
architecture more closely matches the organizational architecture that is in place. One
person interviewed noted "The two programs used the same team structure
[organizational architectures], even though the [technical] architectures are pretty
different. It's obvious that one has done better than the other."
The avionics system is not the only JSF system that has heeded Conway's Law.
The entire organization is divided according to the WBS mentioned in Sections 8.1 and
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9.1, such that interfaces within the system match interfaces between groups working on
the program. The Design Integration Team, which advises the Office of the Chief
Engineer, is designed specifically to match the technical design, and divides its authority
based on technical system boundaries. Additionally, the PDM was designed to mirror the
structure of the program's IPTs. Although the JSF program cannot point to quantifiable
benefits from this matching of designs, it appears that many people in the program are
aware of this design heuristic first posited thirty years ago, and have heeded the advice.
It is currently too early to see the effects on the program.
9.5 Utilizing Network Knowledge: A Barrier on the PDM
Although the PDM system is at the center of the VPC and is its most critical
component, Lockheed Martin did not have experience with PDM systems before the
implementation, and it predictably ran into challenges. Both BAE Systems and Northrop
Grumman had previous experience implementing PDM systems on programs of their
own, but were not active participants in the development and implementation of the PDM
or VPC system on the JSF. The reason cited for this during interviews given by
Lockheed Martin employees was that financial incentives were not in place for them to
participate. The capital for the computing information infrastructure came from Lockheed
Martin, and the other two primary partners were not ready to work on the system without
funding in place to do so, and the funding was not made available.
As a result, many of the lessons and the experience of the other two companies
were not available as Lockheed Martin implemented the VPC on its own. Even though
the two partners would have benefited in the long run by having a capable system up and
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running faster on the program, they did not want to commit resources without having
capital funding in place. Both partners had a smoother experience with their own PDM
implementation in comparison with JSF's PDM, and according to one Lockheed Martin
interviewee, they were not completely happy with Lockheed Martin's final
implementation. It would have benefited the entire extended enterprise, and perhaps
saved the program money, had there been financial incentives in place to have developed
the PDM system collaboratively. In addition to gaining the experience and expertise of
the partners on the program, Lockheed Martin could have had increased buy-in from its
partners on the system, as it would have been a product of the larger team, rather than a
tool developed by a single member that others were obligated to use.
A contributing factor to this problem goes back to the roles that are defined in
enterprise networks, detailed in Chapter 2. The role of assigning the task of working on
the network infrastructure would have likely gone to the Competence Manager in the
enterprise. The competence manager, tasked with assigning network members to tasks
based on their core competencies or prior experience, should ideally be an impartial
party. There is no clear role of a competence manager on the JSF program, and if there
were, that role is occupied by Lockheed Martin, as it awards contracts in the network.
The problem with this arrangement is that there is a natural tendency to internally award
contracts (and realize the associated profits), especially in cases where the core company
making the decisions might want to become more proficient. From the point of view of
Lockheed Martin, there is nothing wrong with this arrangement. It is the prime
contractor, and according to the contract, this decision is its own to make. Strategically, it
would not be likely to award a contract knowingly to a potential future competitor. If,
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however, the customer wanted to ensure that there was a "best" allocation of resources, it
should request that the network use an independent competency manager, and perhaps
insist on independent agents or organizations in the other roles mentioned in Chapter 2 to
ensure a less biased allocation of resources towards the objective of running the virtual
extended enterprise more efficiently and effectively.
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9.6 Organizational Integration Lessons Learned
* There should be clear lines of authority, funding, and control structures in
enterprise networks
* Collocation and site visits are important not only for increased flows of
communication, but also for social cohesion of the network and establishing
cross-network links.
* International partnerships need a large amount of resources
* Organizations should be designed so that information flows in a way very similar
to the flow of information in the technical design
* Proper funding structures should be in place to encourage the network to have its
best resources working on a given task.
* A large amount of resources must be devoted to easing the barriers associated
with data ownership.
* One must ensure that any new system is fully functional before deploying it and
that there is a very rigorous training program to ease the shock of the transition.
* A massive influx of newly hired, newly trained employees help overcome
institutional resistance.
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10 Chapter 10: Conclusions
Virtual extended enterprises are poised to become a more common business structure
in the future, especially in complex, project-based industries such as aerospace. The Joint
Strike Fighter's virtual extended enterprise is one of the first in its industry, and certainly
the flagship for this organizational structure in the military aerospace community. As
such, all eyes in the industry are fixed firmly on it, eager to learn from its challenges and
mimic its successes. From its inception, the JSF Program sought to identify opportunities
for integration and to establish strategies to overcome barriers to integration for their
enterprise. While the program has encountered several obstacles outlined in the case
study, most agree that it is now on track to perform close to the original high
expectations. For these reasons, the lessons learned from the JSF Program's experience
integrating their network is worthy of careful study for those that will follow in its path.
Despite setbacks, integration efforts on the JSF Program have ultimately been
successful in large part because the program spent a large amount of resources during the
creation phase to carefully identify strategic integration goals, and match them closely
with available, maturing technologies for integration. Strategic goals on the JSF Program
included involvement of international partners, high security standards with several levels
of access control, design version control, centralized exchange of data and collaborative
design. Work began on the technical systems years before they were deployed, and
focused on adapting fairly mature, commercially available tools to meet the needs of the
network, rather than developing tools, processes, and infrastructures in-house. This
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proved to be a successful strategy and allowed the JSF Program to develop its
infrastructure fairly quickly.
Another key for successful integration identified on the JSF Program was to match
the extent of integration present in the organizational architecture with the extent of
integration found in the product system architecture in accordance with Conway's Law.
Where possible, organizations that interacted with design and development of technical
systems were designed to mirror the structure of their subsystem. The Design Integration
Teams and Joint Product Assessment Teams are two examples of organizations designed
to match the technical design on the systems on which they work. In cases where the
organization cannot be made to reflect the technical architecture, it may be a wise idea to
change the technical architecture to prevent problems during development. Many
knowledgeable people have accused the F/A-22 of having an overly integrated technical
architecture, making design a very difficult task even for modern organizations integrated
to the fullest extent possible. Learning from the mismatch on the F/A-22, the system
architects of the JSF moved the avionics architecture towards a more federated structure,
which happens to more closely resemble the structure of the organization that designs it.
Another key lesson to be drawn from the JSF Program is that integration strategies
must take into account not just technology and strategy, but also organizational and
socio-technical concerns from the inception. The JSF Program based much of its strategy
on the implementation of several technical systems, such as the Virtual Processing
Center, the JSF Data Library, and the Integrated Management Framework. A significant
amount of resources were invested in the technical aspects of these systems, but little was
invested with the intention of understanding the organizational and socio-technical
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impacts that these systems have on people and organizations when implemented. The
VPC in particular encountered fierce resistance initially from its user base. Despite its
advanced technical design, it did not perform as its users expected. This was due in part
to apathy from its user base during the design of the system when feedback was
requested, lack of sufficient training on the system during deployment, and limited
production testing before deployment. These barriers delayed the wide-spread adoption
of these critical integrated technologies many months, hindering early design efforts.
Had more resources been devoted to dealing with these organizational barriers, the
technical system could have become operational much sooner.
10.1 Policy Concerns
The JSF virtual extended enterprise operates on behalf of the US Department of
Defense, and is directed by the Joint Program Office with input from its international
partners. The JSF Program is a key component of a larger effort by the DoD to reform
military acquisition to become less prone to waste and cost and schedule overruns. The
program was given much more freedom to innovate and dictate its structure and
management than past programs. Despite this newfound flexibility, the primary goal of
the network from the perspective of the DoD should be to provide value to the taxpayers,
rather than to profit the core enterprise.
The structure of the prime contract that guides the creation of the virtual extended
enterprise empowers the prime contractor to develop the network as it sees fit, rather than
imposing rigid guidelines that could prove stifling. While most observers would view
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this positively, it does open up the possibility that the network will not be arranged to
perform optimally.
One example of how this can occur that was observed during the case study was the
assignment of network roles and responsibilities. In extended enterprises, it is often the
case that the core enterprise takes on many of the administrative roles in the network,
often to their benefit. Usually, the network could benefit from a more independent
administrator for many roles such as that of a competence coordinator or a network
coach. These roles allocate tasks and resources in the network. It was observed in
Chapter 9 that the prime contractor took on a major task that others in the network had
more experience with, resulting in delays and setbacks to the successful deployment of
the computer infrastructure for collaborative design and design data storage. This
decision likely had a significant financial impact on the network.
This dilemma could be ameliorated if the JPO decided to make changes to its
policies for awarding contracts. Wording could be included to encourage networks to
seek the services of an unbiased, third party for such roles. It may be possible that a
government agency, similar to the Defense Contract Management Agency, could serve as
this independent broker. Alternatively, the JPO may find it preferable to take a hands off
approach, and allow the prime contractor to structure the network as it sees fit even if it
means some inefficiencies will occur. Regardless, this is a policy choice that must be
studied and made.
Other major policy choices that must be made by the DoD and the US Government
on behalf of the JSF Program include a re-examination of export control laws and of the
international partnerships on the JSF Program. US export control laws, as described in
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Chapter 7, have been shown to be stifling to international cooperation on the
development of weapons platforms without yielding a positive benefit to US national
security. The barriers imposed by ITAR compliance have blocked a major partner, as
well as many secondary tier suppliers, from fully participating in the program, and has
led to "design churn," as waste associated with incomplete knowledge in a design
organization. If the US wishes to continue to collaboratively develop major weapons
platforms with another country, it must seriously consider amending its export control
laws to allow meaningful collaboration. A key step in this process would be to extend
the "Canadian Exemption" to ITAR to the UK, the US' staunch ally. This would
significantly expand the ability of companies such as BAE Systems and Rolls Royce to
contribute to the JSF Program, and would have minimal impact to US national security.
International partnerships on the JSF Program must also go through a careful re-
examination. Many of the international partners on the program, including partners at all
levels of membership, has expressed their frustrations with the current arrangement.
Many of these frustrations stem from US export control laws which restrict how they can
collaborate and what information they may view. Beyond this, however, there is an
architectural disconnect in the program that often leads to frustration. The memorandums
of understanding signed by international participants were bilateral agreements between
each nation and the US government, and not agreements signed between the prime
contractor and international suppliers. There was not a clear mapping between the MOUs
signed between nations and expectations of contract awards on the program. This
disconnect has frustrated many nations that assumed contracts would be awarded in a
manner they were accustomed to (proportional to investment), rather than in the manner
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they have been (best value basis). The US Government needs to restructure these
international relationships to either make clear the separation between contract awards
and development investment, or to directly involve the prime contractor in the MOUs.
10.2 Recommendations fo Further Research
This research has been a very broad overview of integration strategies and the
barriers and enablers faced when forming them for application to virtual extended
enterprises. Due to the breath of this research, there are many opportunities available for
further research in this area. This research was constrained to a single, detailed case study
to elucidate principals and lessons for other virtual extended enterprises in complex,
project-based industries. Future work should seek to include a survey of distinct virtual
extended enterprises in order to compare and contrast integration strategies and develop
more general principals that might guide integration. These networks should be compared
both within a single industry, as well as across industries.
One area worthy of study is the further analysis of the relationship between
integration of technical architectures and organizational architectures. This relationship,
often governed by what has been termed "Conway's Law," is largely anecdotal and has
not received a rigorous academic treatment. Statistical correlations proving increased
performance when architectures are in alignment would prove to be persuasive for
networks undergoing an enterprise architecting processes.
Another study of interest would be an analysis of the network attributes of
integration in a virtual extended enterprise. Virtual extended enterprises are networks
that can be studied using tools developed for use in graph theory to understand the
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properties of networks. It may prove valuable to be able correlate the attributes of
integration in the network, such as average path length between network members, the
percentage of horizontal integrating relationships, and the percentage of multi-layer
vertical integrating relationships to network performance. Such a study will also prove
invaluable to enterprise networks seeking to architect integrative relationships across
their networks.
The virtual extended enterprise is a very new and promising enterprise form that
will likely make great large strides towards becoming a more common business structure
in the future. A large amount of work remains to be accomplished so that industries can
be better prepared to understand how these unique structures can deliver sustainable
competitive advantage in the future.
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List of Acronyms
ASTOVL - Advanced Short Take Off and Vertical Landing
CAD - Computer Aided Design
CAE - Computer Aided Engineering
CALF - Common Advanced Light Fighter
CAM - Computer Aided Manufacturing
CDR- Critical Design Review
CRM - Customer Resource Management
DARPA - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DIT - Design Integration Team
DoD - Department of Defense
EDI - Electronic Document Interchange
EI - Enterprise Integration
ERP - Enterprise Resource Planning
FMS - Foreign Military Sales
IPT - Integrated Product Team
IT - Information Technology
ITAR - International Trade in Arms Regulations
IMF - Integrated Management Framework
JAST - Joint Advanced Strike Technology
JDL - JDF Data Library
JIT - Just in Time
JSF - Joint Strike Fighter
JSFEE - Joint Strike Fighter Extended Enterprise
JPAT - Joint Product Assessment Team
JPO - Joint Program Office
LAI - Lean Aerospace Initiative
MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MOU - Memorandum of Understanding
PDM - Product Data Management
PDR - Preliminary Design Review
RWP - Requirements Work Package
SDD - System Development and Design
SIPD - Supplier Integrated Product Development
SSAC - Strategic Supplier Advisory Council
STOVL - Short Takeoff / Vertical Landing
UK- United Kingdom
US - United States
USMC - United States Marine Corps
WBS - Work Breakdown Structure
VEE - Virtual Extended Enterprise
VPC - Virtual Processing Center
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